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INTRODUCTION

Two years ago, the outbreak of a mysterious virus captivated
the world. First detected in the state of Veracruz, Mexico in April
2009, the virus hopscotched from country to country leaving a trail of
death and panicked citizens.1 Concerned that the virus would continue
to spread, world governments banned travel to affected nations and
urged citizens to take precautionary measures. U.S. Vice President
Biden told citizens not to take mass transit. 2 Airports installed
3
thermal scanners to detect and quarantine infected travelers.
4
Thousands donned surgical masks. Despite these precautions, two
months after the virus's discovery, public health authorities diagnosed
a full-fledged world pandemic. The Center for Disease Control

1.
Gabriele Neumann et al., Emergence and Pandemic Potential of Swine-Origin HIN1
Influenza Virus, 459 NATURE 931, 933 (2009).
Mark Silva & Christi Parsons, White House Adjusts Biden's Swine Flu Advice, L.A.
2.
TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A13, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/01/nationInabidenl.
William Saletan, Heat Check, SLATE, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2217148/.
3.
4.
Swine Flu: Do Surgical Masks Really Work?, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/health/swine.flu/5239580/Swine-flu-do-surgical-masks-really-work.html.
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predicted infection in half the U.S. population and up to 90,000
5
deaths.
In order to limit the virus's reach, scientists tried to figure out
what caused the virus in the first place and which measures would
halt its progress. A research team developed a detailed family tree for6
the virus, tracing its origin to birds, then pigs, and then humans.
Their research showed that the virus had eight genetic segments, six
from swine flu viruses and two from Eurasian bird flu viruses. Once
they understood the virus's story of origin, scientists concluded that it
represented an entirely new strain of H1N1 influenza, one against
which current seasonal vaccines would not protect. 7 A new vaccine
was developed that successfully warded off the virus. Other scientists
studied the early course of the disease, determining that it was
commonly transmitted through contact at schools. As a result, many
schools temporarily closed, thereby reducing its spread through the
population.6 By February 2010, flu activity in the United States had
fallen below average annual totals and most Americans believed that
the threat from the virus had ended. 9
Two years earlier, a panel of judges on the Ninth Circuit had to
decide the law's role in combating an outbreak of intellectual property
infringement. According to plaintiff Perfect 10, which published
copyrighted photographs of nude models, rogue websites were copying
and republishing its trademarks and thousands of its images without
permission. 10 Directly prosecuting the websites was an "impractical"
and "impossible" task, according to Perfect 10.11 Given the sheer
number of these websites, their locations in foreign jurisdictions, and
the anonymizing capabilities of the internet, the only realistic way to
stop the outbreak was through the websites' intermediary: credit card
companies. Consumers used their credit cards to pay for the privilege
Tom Randall & Alex Nussbaum, Hospitals May Face Severe Disruption From Swine
5.
Flu, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=a8_2nrwYDlkM.
6.
Steve Sternberg, Feds to Set Aside $1B for Swine Flu Vaccine Development, USA
TODAY, May 22, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-05-22-swine-flu-vaccineN.htm.
See id. (noting that the swine version of H1N1 diverged from the human strain,
7.
probably through exposure to avian flu, making current vaccines ineffective against it).
8.
Nat'l Health Serv., Swine Flu: Early Epidemiology, July 10, 2009, http://www.rihs.uk
/news/2009/07July/Pages/Swinefluearlyepidemiology.aspx.
9.
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Most Americans Think Swine Flu Pandemic Is Over, a Harvard
Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes
.comI2010/02/06/healthI06flu.html.
10. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788
(9th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-15170), 2005 WL 6252023.
11. Id.at2.

678

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3:675

of viewing the copyrighted photos. Perfect 10 claimed that forcing the
credit card companies to stop processing these payments would stop
13
the infringement.1 2 The credit card companies argued otherwise.
To find an answer, the panel applied the law of contributory
infringement. This doctrine allows intellectual property rights holders
to seek relief not just from direct infringers, but also from those who
knew of and "materially contributed" to infringing behavior. 14 Even
though the doctrine has existed for over a century in U.S. law,15 the
judges were bitterly divided over the material contribution
requirement. A majority found in favor of the credit card companies,
speculating that their contribution was not "material" because, even
without the functionality of credit card transfers, consumers would
find other ways to pay the illegal websites to view the copyrighted
photos.16 A stinging dissent urged liability, contending that the credit
17
card companies played an "essential" role in the infringement.
At first blush, these two incidents have little in common.
Epidemiologists looking for ways to halt the spread of a deadly virus
seem to be engaging in a very different enterprise than judges
determining the liability of a business accused of aiding infringement
of intellectual property. But a closer look reveals common ground. In
both situations, professionals try to assess the effects of particular
acts. In performing these assessments, they envision the likely
outcome if a particular act had not occurred. And in both situations,
they must perform their analysis with only imperfect evidence.18
In some ways, the judges' task may have been harder than the
epidemiologists' because they were stuck applying a doctrine that has
fallen into analytic disrepair. Recent appellate decisions reveal a
chaotic contributory infringement doctrine, which scholars describe as
"uncertain,"19 "contradictory,"20 and "incoherent." 2' Until recently, this
12.
13.
494 F.3d
14.
1971).
15.
16.
17.

18.

Id.
See generally Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n,
788 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-15170), 2005 WL 4155300.
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
See infra Part I.A.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 797-98 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 812-13 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

See Richard A. Goodman, Epidemiology 101: An Overview of Epidemiology and Its

Relevance to U.S. Law, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 153, 159 (2007) (contending that, by its
nature, epidemiology relies on imperfect causal information).
19. Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 957 (2005) ("[A]
muddier standard could hardly threaten [emerging technologies] with more uncertainty than
they face today.").

20.

Rebecca Giblin, A Bit Liable? A Guide to Navigating the U.S. Secondary Liability

Patchwork, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 7, 48-49 (2008) (maintaining that
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body of law was invoked only sporadically. Then, suddenly, digital
technologies made infringement possible to such a degree that it
22
became impossible to prosecute the majority of individual infringers.
In turn, litigants seized on the doctrine of contributory infringement
in order to target intermediaries that could stem the flow of infringing
conduct. 23 Rather than achieving small victories against isolated
individuals, contributory infringement claims could be used to force
internet service providers to help police the web for infringing content.
In a series of opinions, courts responded favorably, softening the
definition of material contribution to encompass more and more
entities. 24 But this expansion came with a cost. The changes in the
material contribution requirement have produced great uncertainty in
what was once a fairly straightforward area of the law. Precedents
used in the brick and mortar world to define "material contribution"
no longer apply. 25 Deprived of a clear roadmap for what makes a
contribution material, courts issued contradictory opinions, even
within the same circuit. 26 Once, contributory infringement only
implicated suppliers of infringing goods. 27 Now, with liability wide
open to anyone who facilitates or even just fails to take precautionary
measures against infringement, the courts have to find another source
28
of legal content to anchor their decisions.

secondary infringement doctrine, including contributory infringement, is a "ragged patchwork"
where "ample authority exists to support a number of competing and contradictory outcomes').
21. Note, Central Bank and Intellectual Property, 123 HARV. L. REV. 730, 740 (2010)
(describing "current doctrines of contributory copyright and trademark liability" as "confusing"
and "incoherent").
22. Lynda J. Oswald, InternationalIssues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property
Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 250 (2008).
23. See Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 911 (2006) (discussing carefully designed litigation campaigns by the entertainment industry);
Peter S. Menell, Indirect Copyright Liability and Technological Innovation, 32 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 375, 386 (2009) (discussing copyright holders strategically targeting enterprises that
facilitate unauthorized distribution).
24. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007); Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 981 (9th Cir. 1999); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also 5 WILLIAM
F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:55 (2009) (discussing the rapidly evolving nature of
technology, the law, and contributory infringement).
25. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 798 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007).
26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part I.
28. See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1172 (holding that "a computer system operator can be
held contributorily liable if it 'has actual knowledge' " of infringement and "can 'take simple
measures to prevent further damage' to copyrighted works yet continues to provide access to
infringing works") (internal citations omitted).
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The courts have turned to two main sources to impose some
logic on their expansion of contributory infringement law. One of these
sources is criminal law, with a number of recent decisions citing to
cases involving criminal liability for accomplices.2 9 In a companion
article, one of us explains why accomplice liability's evidentiary
requirements and focus on retributive punishment make it a poor
30
analogue for contributory infringement.
The other source is tort law. In its most recent contributory
infringement pronouncement, the Supreme Court advised courts
wrestling with these issues to consult tort law's own contributory
liability framework, which it described as "well established."31 The
conventional wisdom among legal scholars agrees with the Court.
Most scholarship in this area contends that obeisance to traditional
tort law principles of contributory liability will fill the void in
infringement law with answers that are adequately calibrated to the
balance between incentivizing creation and permitting downstream
use.

32

This Article challenges that conventional wisdom. Although we
agree that tort law can shed some much-needed light on contributory
infringement, we think that both the Court and most commentators
have dramatically overstated tort law's precedential value in this
context. The law of tortious contributory liability is much more
ambiguous and complex than recent judicial opinions and legal
commentary have indicated. A judge deciding an infringement case via
tort law faces a bewildering array of conflicting legal principles.
Moreover, some of these principles, if employed in the intellectual
property context, would threaten intellectual property law's goal of
spurring technological innovation.33 Hence, it is not enough to urge
the courts to apply traditional tort law doctrine in the context of
intellectual property.
Instead, we suggest that courts add some clarity to the
confusing mishmash of contributory infringement decisions by
adopting the analytical principles of a nonlegal field. Epidemiologists

29. See Mark Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines: The Questionable Role of
Criminal Law in ContributoryInfringement Doctrine, 2009 BYU L. REV. 783, 798 (discussing the
accomplice liability doctrine and its use in intellectual property liability).
30. Id. at 814-26.
31. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930-31 (2005).
32. See infra Part I.D.
33. See infra Part III. Although not discussed in detail here, principles of generalized thirdparty liability under tort law may also not adequately address the free expression concerns often
relevant in contributory infringement cases. See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective
on the Construction of Third-Party Copyright Liability, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1481, 1483-84 (2009).
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try to determine whether particular agents cause disease. 34 Unlike
other biomedical researchers that can rely on randomized
experiments, epidemiologists typically utilize observational studies of
human behavior in a nonclinical environment.3 5 As a result,
epidemiologists have developed a particularly robust model of
causation that tracks multiple variables at once and requires
identification of all features relevant to a causal scenario. 36 Although
detailed causal analysis has been neglected in the latest burst of
contributory infringement case law, it would provide valuable
guidance for judges wrestling with indirect infringement issues. Given
their intuitive appeal, alignment with the guiding principles of
intellectual property protection, and widespread use in other areas of
the law, causal principles could serve as a valuable template for
contributory infringement liability.
Part I of this Article describes the current state of contributory
infringement law and documents the uncertainty that plagues this
area of jurisprudence. A contributory infringer must be shown to have
"knowledge" of infringement and to "materially contribute" to the
infringement. The content of these two requirements remains open to
question, particularly in the area of material contribution. Courts are
so baffled by the material contribution requirement that they end up
adopting inconsistent definitions or straining to fit their analysis
under the knowledge requirement, with which they have more
familiarity. The result is a regime that offers little predictive content
to rights holders and technologists.
Part II explains why, for courts wrestling with questions of
contributory infringement, it is no answer to advocate general
application of tort law standards. Contributory liability doctrine in
common law tort is referred to as "aiding and abetting." The law of
aiding and abetting liability is extremely varied, employing different
doctrinal requirements depending on the property interest at stake.
Great uncertainty surrounds this doctrine, making it a generally inapt
choice for content in the expanding field of contributory infringement.
Because of these problems, a call to apply common law aiding
and abetting principles to contributory infringement cases is too
simplistic. Instead, we focus on a single aspect of contributory tort
liability: the analysis of causation. Tort law's concept of causation,

34.
943, 945
35.
(2008).
36.

Douglas L. Weed, Truth, Epidemiology, and General Causation, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 943,
n.6 (2008).
Richard Scheines, Causation, Truth, and the Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 972-73
See infra Part III.
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reflected in its "but-for" and "substantial factor" tests, offers useful
guidance in determining what is and is not a material contribution for
purposes of contributory infringement. Most valuable to contributory
infringement doctrine would be the adoption of tort law's strict
demarcation between analysis of factual causation and questions of
legal scope, public policy, and social justice that are packed into the
concept of proximate cause. Since the 1920s, legal scholars have urged
judges to separately consider actual causation and policy concerns in
their tort law decisions. Eventually, these urgings led to a formal
37
bifurcation of the two analyses in most jurisdictions.
Somehow the judges evaluating contributory liability for
intellectual property violations did not get the memo. In recent crucial
contributory infringement decisions, the courts have wrapped their
causal analysis with public policy arguments, making it difficult to
determine the limits of their reasoning. The result is a number of
vague precedents cloaked in scientific language that threaten
sweeping liability rules for technologists. These precedents are also
plagued by inconsistencies as to the causal effects of creating an
environment where infringement can occur. We advocate greater
attention to the causal reasoning used in tort law in general, and
aiding and abetting law in particular, to avoid these problems.
Yet even if courts transplanted every rule from tort law's
causal framework to today's contributory infringement cases, the
results would still be suboptimal. As contributory infringement
doctrine has expanded to include new types of commercial enterprises,
causation questions have become increasingly complex. Meanwhile,
despite decades of use, causal analysis in U.S. tort law, particularly
with regard to secondary actors, remains underdeveloped. As we
explain in Part III, the "but-for" and "substantial factor" causation
tests are rooted in the past and ill-equipped to deal with the nuances
of the information economy. The "but-for" test neglects certain actors
that courts have routinely penalized for their involvement in tortious
activity, and the "substantial factor" test is devoid of any real content
to guide a court's decision.
Instead, in Part III we turn to a nonlegal discipline. The field of
epidemiology studies factors influencing the health of populations to
find better routes for the treatment and prevention of disease. In their
effort to isolate disease-producing events, epidemiologists are
continually refining the study of causation. By modeling the complex
interaction between causal agents, epidemiologists gain a better sense

37.

See infra Part II.B.1.
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of where resources should be deployed in combating diseases that
adversely affect public health.
We advocate similar moves in intellectual property law to help
determine which intermediaries should face liability for others'
infringing conduct. Epidemiologists employ a causation model that
takes a global look at various causal components. Such a model better
tracks how the online business world really works and defines
causation in a way that permits liability in the face of duplicative
causal acts. The epidemiologists' model also distinguishes between
general and specific causation, something the courts hearing
contributory infringement cases have failed to do altogether. Finally, a
central tenet of the epidemiological model is the specification of a
reasonable referent for each link on the proposed causal chain. An
epidemiologist is trained to consider causal factors only with respect to
some alternative. By borrowing from the epidemiologists' playbook,
judges evaluating contributory infringement disputes can separate the
causal from the noncausal and the actionable from the nonactionable
instead of relying on hazy intuition and words like "material
contribution" that are empty of real content.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CONTRIBUTORY
INFRINGEMENT STANDARD

Whether the intellectual property right at issue is a patent,
copyright, or a trademark, the same two criteria must be satisfied to
demonstrate contributory infringement. First, it must be shown that
the defendant had knowledge of infringement of the right by another.
Second, the defendant must "materially contribute" to the
infringement. The contours of these two categories have changed over
time and continue to evolve. Yet they still remain confusingly opaque
to businesses that must assess their own potential for contributory
liability. This Part describes how courts evaluate these criteria and
highlights the questions regarding contributory infringement that
remain unanswered.
A. Knowledge
Judicial recognition of actions for contributory infringement
began in the late nineteenth century. 38 Courts initially only recognized
38.

See Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH.

L. REV. 635, 650 (2007) (tracing the origination of indirect infringement in patent law to 1871
and the case of Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100)); see also id. at
664 (crediting Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), with originating the doctrine of
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liability for intentional acts.3 9 Thus, in 1912, the Supreme Court
defined contributory patent infringement as "the intentional aiding of
one person or another in the unlawful making, or selling, or using of
the patented invention. ' 40 Similarly, in the case of Kalem Co. v.
HarperBrothers, the Court explained that the defendant was liable for
contributory infringement of the copyright in a novel because it "not
only expected but invoked by advertisement" the use of its film version
of the novel in a manner that would violate the novelist's reproduction
right. 41 Subsequent courts interpreted the Kalem decision as imposing
liability for selling a work with the intention that it would be used by
42
others in an infringing manner.
Pressure grew to expand the scope of contributory liability,
however. New technologies permitted others to utilize and manipulate
intellectual property in new ways. 43 Courts, prodded by a strategic
litigation campaign coordinated by leaders in the entertainment
industry, 44 came to fear that this technology would unjustly enrich
secondary actors at the expense of originators and destroy the latter's
creative incentives. 45 Recently, digital distribution has made end users
a threat to the copyright holders' bottom line as one person with an
internet connection can provide a copyrighted work to millions. As a
result, content industries have aggressively shifted their litigation
strategy to target intermediaries in the hope of choking off access to
46
individual end users.

contributory copyright infringement); id. at 674-75 (tracing contributory trademark
infringement to two cases from 1890 and 1891).
39. Id. at 652-53.
40. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1912) (quoting Thomson-Houston Elec. Co.
v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 72 F. 1016, 1017 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896)).
41. 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911).
42. See Underhill v. Schenck, 143 N.E. 773, 776 (N.Y. 1924) (Cardozo, J.) ("One who sells a
film with the intention that the buyer shall use it in the infringement of a copyrighted drama is
himself liable as an infringer.").
43. Craig A. Grossman, The Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability and Contributory
Infringement: From InterstitialGap Filler to Arbiter of the Content Wars, 58 SMU L. REV. 357,
371 (2005).
44. Id. at 371-74; see also 5 PATRY, supra note 24, at § 21:55 (describing surge in
contributory infringement lawsuits that has paralleled growth of the World Wide Web).
45. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777, 782-83 (2004) (discussing decisions that broadened trademark
law and rested on the premise that secondary actors should be prevented from profiting from
using another's intellectual property).
46. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1368 (2004) (arguing that innovators are
more likely today to be found liable for vicarious copyright infringement and for contributory
infringement); see also John B. Meisel, Economic and Legal Issues Facing YouTube and Similar
Internet Hosting Web Sites, 12 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1 (2009) (discussing Viacom's decision to follow
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The most obvious place to start expanding the circle of
contributory infringement liability was the mental state requirement.
While someone is generally viewed as more culpable if they intend for
a wrongful act to be committed, 47 it also seems fair to hold responsible
those who know of wrongful conduct and not only fail to prevent that
conduct, but also do something to facilitate it.48 In time, for all three of
the intellectual property doctrines, evidence of mere knowledge of
infringement came to be accepted as sufficient for contributory
infringement. 49 Parties indifferent to infringement could now be held
liable if they knew about the infringement and somehow contributed
to it.50 Subsequent cases weakened the knowledge requirement even
further, permitting a finding of contributory infringement on the basis
of constructive knowledge, that is, knowledge based on a reasonable
person standard rather than on the subjective mindset of the
contributory defendant. 51 Although a generalized suspicion of
infringement usually will not be enough to satisfy the knowledge
standard, 52 if it was reasonable for the defendant to think that
53
infringement was taking place, the knowledge standard is satisfied.
this litigation strategy, which was used previously by the Recording Industry Association of
America); Seth A. Miller, Note, Peer-to-PeerFile Distribution:An Analysis of Design, Liability,
Litigation, and Potential Solutions, 25 REV. LITIG. 181, 193-94 (2006) (noting this strategy's
predominance).
47. See Grace E. Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
2169, 2173 (1988) ("Desert is calculated by the level of culpability involved in the crime, and
culpability is tied to the criminal's mental state."); see also Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral
Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 320 (1996) (contending that culpability occurs when one
"chooses to do [a] wrong in circumstances when that choice is freely made").
48. See Grossman, supra note 43, at 365-66 (arguing it seems fair to hold a party
accountable when he knows his actions assist another in infringing); cf. United States v. Int'l
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Whether postulated
as a problem of 'mens rea,' of 'willfulness,' of 'criminal responsibility,' or of 'scienter,' the infliction
of criminal punishment upon the unaware has long troubled the fair administration of justice.");
Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and FairAdjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
335, 358 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court often cites the "fair warning" provided by a law's
scienter requirement to refute challenges to statutes based on vagueness).
49. Adams, supra note 38, at 657.
50. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 425, 455 (D. Del. 1997).
51. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting the knowledge
requirement to include those with reason to know); Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th
Cir. 1987) (same).
52. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 (1982) (White, J., concurring);
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2010); Monsanto Co. v. Campuzano, 206
F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278-79 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see also Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.
Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that "knowledge of a generalized practice of
infringement in the industry" does not satisfy the knowledge standard under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act).
53. See Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir.
1990) (stating that the knowledge standard is an objective test).
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to
Moreover, a defendant that suspects wrongdoing and fails
54
investigate will also be deemed to satisfy the knowledge standard.
Courts are unlikely to water down the mental state
requirement much further. Although liability for direct infringement
has historically been a strict liability offense, contributory
infringement has traditionally been viewed as an inappropriate
candidate for strict liability, that is, liability without evidence of a
culpable mental state. 55 Rather, the cases show a repeated emphasis
on scienter requirements when courts are presented with new
56
scenarios involving contributory infringement.
B. Material Contribution
Like the knowledge standard, the material contribution
standard has evolved over time to encompass an increasingly wide
array of behavior. To make a material contribution, the defendant
must act. Merely benefitting from the directly infringing activity is not
enough. 57 But not every sort of action is enough for contributory
liability. The real issue in evaluating the material contribution
standard is determining which activities are sufficiently "material" to
justify liability.
Initially, the courts limited the material contribution standard
to suppliers of infringing items, or components thereof. In the arena of
trademark law, for many years only manufacturers and distributors of

54. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003); Hard Rock Cafe
Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992).
55. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1690-92 (2007) (discussing policy reasons for maintaining
the distinction between direct and indirect infringement); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
876 caveat (1977) (cautioning against any assumption that the Restatement's formulation of
aiding and abetting liability is applicable "when the conduct of either the actor or the other is
free from intent to do harm or negligence but involves strict liability for the resulting harm").
56. See generally JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM § 5A.03[11-[21 (2000).
57. A separate legal doctrine, the doctrine of vicarious infringement, imposes liability for
the infringing conduct of another when the defendant receives a financial benefit from the
infringement and enjoys a particular relationship with the direct infringer. See, e.g., AT&T v.
Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1440-41 (3d Cir. 1994); Gershwin Publ'g Corp.
v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). While both vicarious and
contributory infringement permit liability for infringement against parties other than direct
infringers, they are separate doctrines with differing theoretical justifications and should be kept
analytically distinct. 5 PATRY, supra note 24, § 21:41; see also John Gardner, Complicity and
Causality, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 127, 130 n.2 (2007) (explaining that vicarious liability means
responsibility for another's wrongful acts "irrespective of one's own participation in them").
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the infringing goods could provide a material contribution. 58 Patent
law limited contributory liability to sellers of components or materials
used to infringe. 59 Copyright law took a somewhat broader view of
contributory liability, but there were very few cases invoking the
doctrine before 1976,60 and those that did typically involved supplying
61
the materials for infringement.
As pressure built to enlarge the scope of contributory
infringement, courts had to adopt a broader, more flexible definition of
material contribution and yet still retain some limits on liability.
Courts have attacked this problem in a variety of ways, 62 but their
doctrinal innovations can be grouped under two approaches. One
approach has been to examine the relationship between the
contributory defendant and the direct infringer. 63 Second, a related
but different tactic is to examine the relationship between the
contributory defendant and the actual act of infringement."4
Under either approach, the result is that instead of only
holding suppliers of infringing items liable, courts have come to
recognize the culpability of all sorts of commercial actors excluded
from responsibility under the old regime. Rather than limiting
liability to suppliers of infringing goods, or the raw materials to
construct those goods, courts now recognize the culpability of
advertising agencies, 65 internet service providers, 66 art galleries, 67 flea
markets, 68 and online auction houses. 69 Recently, the Ninth Circuit
58. See Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276,
1279-80 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding only one case that extended the theory beyond manufacturers
or distributors).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006).
60. 5 PATRY, supra note 24, § 21:45.
61. Id.
62. Id. § 21:46 (describing various formulations and uncertainties regarding the material
contribution standard).
63. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir.
1999); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
64. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'n Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998);
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04, at 12-85 (2008) ("[1In order to be
deemed a contributory infringer, the authorization or assistance must bear some direct
relationship to the infringing acts .... ").
65. Gillette v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 662, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
66. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004).
67. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
68. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1003 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
69. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 503-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that
eBay provided a material contribution to infringement but ultimately declining to hold that the
eBay online auction website was contributory liable).
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expanded the number of relationships sufficient to satisfy the material
contribution standard further, imposing liability when a defendant
that operates online can take "simple measures" to stop infringement,
70
but fails to do so.
C. Safe Harbors
Not all of the changes to contributory infringement law
resulted in greater liability. As the knowledge and material
contribution standards have been weakened, courts have carved out
two safe harbors from liability. For both patent and copyright law,
contributory infringement doctrine evolved to create a safe harbor for
suppliers of goods that can facilitate infringement. Now, even when a
supplier is aware of the infringing activity, the law exempts the
supplier from liability if its goods are capable of noninfringing uses.
Section 271(c) of the Patent Act, enacted by Congress in 1952, exempts
the supplier of "a staple article or commodity of commerce" from
liability even when the article is subsequently used, with the
supplier's knowledge, for infringement of a patent.7 1 Similarly, in
copyright law, manufacturers of technologies having "substantial
noninfringing uses" are exempt from liability even if they are aware of
the infringing activity.72 No such safe harbor exists for accused
secondary trademark infringers, although the Lanham Act does
provide certain limitations on the type of relief granted against
73
publishers and printers.
Recent cases, however, have limited the availability of these
safe harbors. With its 2005 Grokster decision, the Supreme Court
suggested one type of contributory infringement-inducement
liability-that is ineligible for the exemption for substantially
noninfringing suppliers. In Grokster,the Court held that a distributor
of peer-to-peer software used to share both copyrighted and

70. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal.
1995)).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006); see also Veritas Operating Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 562 F.
Supp. 2d 1141, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2008) ("[Supreme Court precedent] suggests that if the device
[provided by the defendant] has an unrelated use beyond the scope of patent protection ... an
inevitable possible use which directly infringes does not cause the seller of the device to
contributorily infringe.").
72. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
73.

15 U.S.C. § 1114(2). Mark Lemley suggests that the limitation contained in the

Lanham Act should serve as a model for other intellectual property regimes and, in general,
should be invoked with greater frequency. Mark A. Lemley, RationalizingInternet Safe Harbors,
6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 106 (2007).
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uncopyrighted music and motion picture files could not take
7 4
advantage of the "substantial noninfringing uses" safe harbor.
Because, in the Court's view, there was "clear expression" of the
distributor's intent to induce copyright infringement, the distributor
forfeited its eligibility for the safe harbor.7 5 Thus, proof of intent to
cause infringement, rather than mere knowledge, trumps the
substantial noninfringing uses defense. The Patent Act recognizes a
similar sort of liability for manufacturers and distributors that
intentionally cause others to infringe, 76 and courts evaluating
contributory trademark infringement disputes appear to be moving in
the same direction.7 7 Moreover, a recent appellate opinion shrinks the
substantial noninfringing uses defense even further. According to the
Federal Circuit, if a product provided by the contributory defendant
contains separable components, one of which provides a substantial
noninfringing use and the other of which infringes, the safe harbor
78
does not apply.
D. Unresolved Questions of ContributoryInfringement Liability
As suggested earlier, many issues remain unresolved in the
law of contributory infringement.7 9 There is some disagreement among
80
the courts about how to evaluate the knowledge requirement.
Copyright case law is particularly plagued with inconsistency
regarding how this requirement should be evaluated, with some courts
81
requiring more detailed knowledge of infringement than others.
Similarly, with regard to the inducement type of contributory
infringement, it remains undetermined whether a defendant's

74. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005).
75. Id. at 936-37.
76. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating
"[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer").
77. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007)
(examining inducement in contributory trademark disputes).
78. See Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1336-40 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(explaining that an inducer cannot gain safe harbor by bundling the infringement inducing
product with another product).
79. See supranotes 19-21 and accompanying text.
80. See Mark Bartholomew, Copyright, Trademark and Secondary Liability After Grokster,
32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 455 (2009) (describing how some copyright decisions seem to require
proof of knowledge of specific instances of infringement while other copyright decisions require
only "reasonable knowledge" of infringement); see also Mitchell N. Berman et al., State
Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to 'Fix" Florida Prepaid (and
How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1064 (2001) (maintaining that "concepts of mens rea have not
been fleshed out" in intellectual property law).
81. See Bartholomew, supra note 80, at 454-58.
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subjective yet erroneous belief that the direct infringer's conduct is not
infringing or constitutes fair use should exempt the defendant from
82
liability.
Even more unsettled is the current state of the material
contribution requirement, which is the focus of this Article.8 3 The
problem is not so much that different courts have developed different
tests for evaluating material contribution. Rather, the doctrine
remains so amorphous that courts are unclear as to how to apply their
own tests. In 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Google could potentially be liable for the infringing acts of websites
that used copyrighted images without authorization, resting its
analysis on the search engine's role in facilitating consumer efforts to
find the infringing content. 84 But "facilitat[ing] access" was not enough
just a few weeks later when the same plaintiff charged Visa with
contributory infringement for processing credit card payments made
by customers to obtain access to the images on the infringing
websites.8 5 In that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the material
contribution requirement had not been satisfied, but offered little
86
justification for the different result.

82. See 5 PATRY, supranote 24, § 21:41; Adams, supra note 38, at 635; see also SEB S.A. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc. v. SEB S.A., 79 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 10-6) (granting certiorari on the
question of whether the legal standard for the state of mind element of a claim for actively
inducing patent infringement is "deliberate indifference of a known risk" that an infringement
may occur, or "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" to encourage an infringement).
83. Although the uncertainty surrounding the required mental state for contributory
infringement is problematic, we are more concerned with the material contribution requirement
for two reasons. First, there is a tradition in the common law of requiring judges and juries to
engage in rigorous scrutiny of a defendant's mental state, often forcing them to identify one
mental state among many. See Kevin John Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 318 (2009); see also Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really Need So Many
Mental and Emotional States in United States Patent Law?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279 (2000)
(discussing the variety of mental and emotional states that courts are required to assess in
determining various aspects of patent law). Hence, courts routinely face tough decisions as to the
defendant's knowledge of wrongdoing in many areas of the law and there does not appear to be
an outcry over this state of affairs. Second, to the extent the law has not done a good job of
figuring out exactly what mental state should be required for contributory infringement, we
contend that the variation in the cases will begin to narrow because courts seem to agree that a
strict liability rule is inappropriate for contributory liability. See supra notes 55-56 and
accompanying text.
84. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). Months later, the
Ninth Circuit amended its opinion but did not alter its analysis of contributory liability. Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
85. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 862 (9th Cir. 2007).
86. The Visa court suggested that "location services" are somehow different from "payment
services" but offered no real explanation why one is more material than the other. Id. at 797 n.8.
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As mentioned earlier, courts have recently shifted the analysis
from supply of infringing items to either (1) the relationship between
defendant and direct infringer or (2) the relationship between
defendant and the act of infringement. In doing so, the courts replaced
a bright-line rule with a hazy standard. Of course, not any
relationship with the direct infringer will do. Courts have tried to give
content to the first relationship requirement-the relationship
between defendant and direct infringer-by emphasizing that the
relationship needs to be one of "control." Thus, liability is reserved for
87
those defendants demonstrating an ability to direct the infringer.
Following this trend, the Supreme Court explained that a contributory
copyright infringer must be "in a position to control the use of
copyrighted works by others."8 8 And in expanding liability beyond
manufacturers and distributors, in recent years contributory
trademark infringement doctrine recognized that a material
contribution could also be made when there was "direct control" of the
instrumentality used by a third party to infringe.8 9 "Control" is an
inherently vague term so it is not surprising that no coherent
definition of control has been established. We can say, however, that
courts have construed the term broadly. 90 The relationship of control
92
need not be formalized. 91 Nor need it even be actually exercised.
Rather, just the potential to regulate the behavior of the direct
93
infringer can constitute a relationship of control.
The second modern approach to the material contribution
requirement examines the relationship between the contributory
defendant and the actual act of infringement. If the former is too

87. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984).
88. Id.
89. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999).
Also related to analysis of the dynamic between the defendant and the direct infringer, courts
have looked to whether the defendant engages in active monitoring of the direct infringer. See id.
For example, a flea market owner that patrols its market, scrutinizing the behavior of its
vendors, is deemed to have a sufficiently dominant relationship over those vendors to satisfy the
material contribution standard. See Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc.,
955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1992).
90. Lauren Katzenellenbogen et al., Alternative Software Protection in View of In re Bilski,
7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332, 334 (2009).
91. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d Cir.
1971).
92. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (stating that a contributory
infringer must be "ina position to control the use of copyrighted works by others").
93. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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"attenuated" from the latter, then there is no material contribution. 94
Of course, this begs the question as to when a contributory defendant
should be deemed so far removed from the infringing activity as to be
exempt from liability. According to some courts, providing "the means"
for direct infringement is sufficiently proximate to be a material
96
contribution, 95 but others disagree.
Neither approach has lent much clarity to the material
contribution analysis. 91 It remains unclear which relationships and
activities satisfy the material contribution requirement. Judicial
determinations in this area now have less predictive force because
concepts like control and attenuation are vague and their relevance
98
changes depending on the context.
In addition, it remains unclear after Grokster how a court
should apply the material contribution requirement in cases where the
defendant has been found to have intentionally induced
infringement. 99 On the one hand, the Grokster decision says nothing
about a change in how the materiality of the defendant's contribution
should be evaluated when there is proof of intent. On the other hand,
it makes little sense to burden the plaintiff with the extra difficulty of
proving intent rather than knowledge unless there is some
corresponding reduction in the evidence of contribution required for
liability. 100

94. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
95. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); see also, e.g.,
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998); A & M Records, Inc. v.
Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
96. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007); Livnat v.
Lavi, No. 96 CIV. 4967(RWS), 1998 WL 43221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1998) (stating that
providing the "means to accomplish an infringing activity" is not enough to satisfy the material
contribution standard).
97. See Giles S. Rich, Contributory Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 99, 100 (2005); Lemley,
supra note 73, at 102 (describing the confusing nature of contributory infringement safe
harbors).
98. See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 80, at 457-58 (describing split among courts
evaluating contributory copyright infringement claims with some considering the degree of
separation between the defendant and direct infringer and others deeming this irrelevant).
99. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 800-02 (9th Cir. 2007)
(indicating that the two types of contributory liability could be described as "material
contribution liability" and "inducement liability"); Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 2d 124, 150 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing "doubt" among some courts as to whether
Grokster-style inducement states a separate claim for relief or whether it is a species of
contributory infringement).
100. In assessing contributory liability for criminal actions, the law holds the prosecution to
a high burden of proof in demonstrating the requisite mental state, but a very low threshold for
demonstrating a sufficient contribution to the criminal act. See Bartholomew, supra note 29, at
797-807.
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Other legal scholars have documented the confused state of
contributory infringement jurisprudence. 101 The common prescription
for this confusion is closer adherence to the common law moorings of
contributory infringement. 102 Jay Dratler explains that infringement
is "just a kind of tort" that involves the same questions of duty,
proximate cause, and culpability characteristic of tort law in
general.1 0 3 Fred Yen applauds importing fault-based doctrines from
tort law to assess the liability of contributory infringers.10 4 Peter
Menell and David Nimmer argue that tort law's products liability

101. See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Common-Sense (Federal)Common Law Adrift in a Statutory
Sea, or Why Grokster Was a Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 413, 436 (2006); Grossman, supra note 43, at 363; Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal
Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De
Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143, 186 (2007); Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the
Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 842-43 (2005) [hereinafter Yen, Tort
Doctrines];Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 184,
212 (2006) [hereinafter Yen, Third-Party].
102. Jay Dratler, Jr., Palsgraf, Principles of Tort Law, and PersistentNeed for Common-Law
Judgment in IP Infringement Cases, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 23, 33 (2009) (contending that
"good things might follow" if secondary infringement law was "returned to the 'fundamental
things' of tort law like proximate cause"); Menell & Nimmer, supra note 101, at 149 ("[T]he tort
principles that have guided copyright law since its inception should continue to guide copyright's
further evolution."); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941,
1022 (2007) (faulting the Sony decision for failing to apply tort principles of secondary liability);
Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, supra note 101, at 852 ("[C]ourts have borrowed too little from tort
law in the existing construction of third party copyright liability."); Yen, Third-Party,supra note
101, at 190 ("[Tlhe most important theories of tort... shed considerable light on the construction
of third-party copyright liability."); Jason Kessler, Note, Correcting the Standard for
Contributory Trademark Liability Over the Internet, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 375, 411
(2006) (calling for "preserving traditional standards" of contributory liability in dealing with the
new context of trademark infringement via the internet); Cynthia Miller, Comment, Do You
Grok? Substantial Certainty in Contributory Copyright Infringement, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT
REV. 591, 592 (2006) ("Contributory copyright infringement is a tort; thus, tort law principles
should apply.").
103. Dratler, supra note 102102, at 25. Dratler maintains that tort law's "notion of
proximate cause" and "the principle of culpability" will allow the courts to build "a rational
jurisprudence of secondary liability." Id. at 26-27. But courts are currently applying their own
notions of proximate cause and culpability and yet are still unable to sort out the contradictions
in contributory infringement law. Proximate cause presents a particular difficulty. While we do
not advocate removing proximate cause completely from the contributory infringement analysis,
courts need to stop conflating proximate cause with cause in fact. See infra Part II. A clearer
separation between the two would give courts a greater opportunity to make the decisions based
on the facts of the marketplace that Dratler advocates. See Dratler, supranote 101, at 453-54.
104. Yen, Third-Party, supra note 101, at 190, 212. Yen contends that contributory
copyright infringement's origin in tort law supports a greater focus on mental state and a lesser
emphasis on aggregate social welfare in determining liability. See id. at 189-90 & n.23. Although
we agree with Yen's point that modern tort law stresses knowledge, we think that an
examination of aiding and abetting liability, the closest tort law analog to contributory
infringement, demonstrates an even greater emphasis on the effects of the defendant's
contribution to the victim's injury. See infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.

694

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3:675

precedents provide the strongest metric for evaluating secondary
105
infringement claims.
At first blush, importing tort law standards to contributory
infringement makes sense. Contributory infringement doctrine
originated in tort law. 10 6 Common law tort has long provided for the
liability of defendants that do not directly commit the violation at
issue. 0 7 In its most recent pronouncement on contributory
infringement, the Supreme Court directed lower courts to evaluate
contributory liability in light of "rules of fault-based liability derived
from the common law."'0 8 Nevertheless, there are some serious
shortcomings in the relevant tort secondary liability jurisprudence
that make its use in contributory infringement questionable. In Parts
II and III, we evaluate whether tort law can cure what ails
contributory infringement doctrine.
II. COMPARING CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY DOCTRINE IN IP WITH
CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY DOCTRINE IN TORT LAW

The Supreme Court has explained that intellectual property
indirect liability doctrines are based "on principles recognized in every
part of the law." 10 9 Yet application of these principles to intellectual
property disputes is less than certain. Contributory liability rules for
tort are most commonly referred to as the law of "aiding and
105. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 101, at 149; Menell & Nimmer, supra note 102, at 996.
Menell and Nimmer contend that contributory infringement stems from a "tort wellspring" that
mandates use of the cost-benefit analysis employed by some common law courts when deciding
whether a "reasonable alternative design" was available to a products liability defendant. Menell
& Nimmer, supra note 102, at 1017-19. Contributory infringement's tort law heritage is
undeniable, but products liability standards are not the best fit for the doctrine's current
problems. As Ed Lee points out, products liability and secondary liability are different legal
regimes with the latter arguably meant to be more sensitive to net social benefits and less
sensitive to making the victim whole than the former. Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42
GA. L. REV. 309, 389 (2008). Moreover, products liability doctrine remains unsettled, making it
unclear just how beneficial its importation would be for courts trying to develop content for the
material contribution requirement. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of
Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003).
106. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:23 (4th ed. 2005); 3
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 64, § 12.04[A][2]; Sverker K Hogberg, Note, The Search for
Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 914
(2006).
107. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed.
1984).
108. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-35 (2005).
109. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911); see also John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 917, 919 (2010) (describing intellectual
property infringement doctrine as a "contemporary extension" of tort law).

2011]

CA USING INFRINGEMENT

695

abetting."1 10 The law of civil aiding and abetting remains unsettled,
leaving intellectual property courts with plenty of precedent but little
concrete guidance in adjudicating contributory infringement claims.
This makes civil aiding and abetting law, by itself, a poor candidate
for solving the unresolved questions of contributory infringement
liability.
Causation, however, is one strand of aiding and abetting case
law that can be very useful to courts grappling with questions of
contributory infringement. In determining the civil liability of indirect
actors, courts often focus their attention on the substantiality of the
defendant's contribution to the illegal act at issue. This resembles
contributory
infringement
doctrine's
material
contribution
requirement. Yet unlike the courts investigating contributory
infringement, judges weighing the liability of an accused aider and
abettor often explicitly consider the causal relationship between the
defendant's actions and the illegal act. A defendant should not be
liable for aiding and abetting until it can be shown that its actions are
a "substantial factor in causing the resulting tort." ' ' This emphasis
on causation would prove helpful in contributory infringement cases,
although, as we argue in Part III, tort law's analysis of causation is
110. For the purposes of this Article, we are only evaluating the tort doctrine of aiding and
abetting. Two other potential tort law secondary liability causes of action deserve brief mention.
Although "closely allied" with aiding and abetting liability, Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., 290 F.
Supp. 2d 1101, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2003), the tort doctrine of conspiracy is somewhat different and
less analogous to contributory infringement doctrine. A conspiracy requires an agreement as well
as an act causing harm while aiding and abetting requires assistance to the direct tortfeasor but
no agreement. Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 Bus. LAw 1135,
1138 (2006); see also Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The two doctrines
also differ in that the only assistance necessary for civil conspiracy liability is the assistance
inherent in the agreement itself, whereas liability for aiding and abetting requires additional
facilitation of the wrongful act. Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability,
58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 257-58 (2005). Also excluded from our analysis is liability under section
876(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under 876(c), one is subject to liability if one gives
"substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person." It is rare that such a
separate duty will be found in the case of intermediaries in intellectual property cases. See, e.g.,
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(finding that no independent duty existed for domain name registrar to prevent internet usages
that infringed on plaintiffs trademark); MDT Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1028,
1033-34 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("Instead, MDT Corp. appears to interpret Inwood Laboratories to
impose an affirmative duty on innocent third party users of a mark to police the mark for its
owner. No such duty exists."). Unlike aiding and abetting liability, liability under 876(c) of the
Restatement does not require any knowledge on the part of the defendant. See Combs, supra, at
262.
111. The requirements for aiding and abetting liability are set out in section 876(b) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. (1979) ("If
the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one
giving it is himself a tortfeasor, and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act.").
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not sophisticated enough in its current state and needs bolstering
from an additional source.
A. Uncertainty SurroundingAiding and Abetting Doctrine
On the surface, aiding and abetting law applies the same basic
requirements as contributory infringement law. Some proof of
knowledge of the underlying tortious act is mandatory to find a
defendant liable for aiding and abetting. 112 It also must be shown that
3
the defendant's conduct "substantially" assisted the wrongful act."
These requirements bear a close resemblance to the knowledge and
material contribution elements of contributory infringement.
Yet despite this rough parallel and the suggestions of some
courts and commentators, applying aiding and abetting precedent to
contributory infringement disputes is no easy task. Although civil
liability for the actions of others has been a feature of the U.S. legal
system from its beginnings, the courts have not yet come to agreement
on aiding and abetting law's exact features. 1 4 The doctrine of aiding
115
and abetting can euphemistically be described as "underdeveloped."
Courts have generally been confused about which test should be used
to determine liability." 6 Judges have noted their own frustration at
the doctrine's unsettled state despite the availability of numerous

112. 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 3:4, at 401 (1983) (stating
that a contributory tortfeasor must recognize that the direct tortfeasor's conduct constituted a
breach of duty in order to be held liable). Moreover, most common law civil courts require actual
knowledge before holding a defendant liable for aiding and abetting. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1358 (D. Utah. 1984) (stating that there can be no liability for aiding
and abetting "without a higher degree of scienter than recklessness"); AA Tube Testing Co. v.
Sohne, 246 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 (1964) (actual knowledge required for inducing breach of contract);
In re Consol. Welfare Fund ERISA Litig., 856 F. Supp. 837, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It is clear
[under Cailifornia law] that liability for aiding and abetting a tort cannot attach absent actual
knowledge of the underlying tort.").
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1965); Combs, supra note 110, at 275
("The fundamental basis for aiding and abetting liability is that the defendant both (1) knows of
the primary actor's wrongful conduct; and (2) substantially assists or encourages the primary
wrongdoer to so act."); see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 511 F. Supp.
2d 742, 802 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
114. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
188-89 (1994) (noting that "the rules for determining aiding and abetting liability are unclear");
Note, supra note 21, at 737 ("Civil aiding and abetting liability is applied with notorious
inconsistency.").
115. Combs, supra note 110, at 249; see also AT&T v. Winback, 42 F.2d 1421, 1430 (3d Cir.
1994) ("And in fact, aiding and abetting liability is not a well-settled mechanism for imposing
civil liability.").
116. Combs, supranote 110, at 255.
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opinions wrestling with the knowledge and substantial assistance
requirements.

117

Just as with the contributory infringement jurisprudence,
uncertainty exists as to the precise boundaries of the knowledge
inquiry."18 Likewise, confusion remains as to how to define
"substantial" assistance." 9 Courts typically assess an abetting
defendant's participation under a six-factor test. 20 Some of these
factors, like "the defendant's relation to the primary tortfeasor," are
fairly imprecise, resulting in the same sort of uncertainty already
121
faced by contributory infringement defendants.
Other inconsistencies also make it hard to define aiding and
abetting law. While some courts treat the knowledge and substantial
assistance requirements as independent variables that both must be
fully satisfied, 122 others apply a sliding scale analysis that reduces the
quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy the knowledge requirement
when there is particularly strong proof of substantial assistance, and
vice versa. 123 Commentators diagnose a conflict between the rules for
aiding and abetting liability as articulated in the Restatement of Torts
and as applied by the courts, 24 even though the published decisions
maintain fealty to the language of the Restatement. 125 In addition, the
rules of aiding and abetting liability can change depending on

117. E.g., IIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 922 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980).
118. Combs, supra note 110, at 265-67, 283.
119. Id. at 293 ("[The confusion begins when one attempts to apply the principles of the
substantial factor test to the theory of civil aiding and abetting.").
120. The six factors considered are: (1) the nature of the act encouraged; (2) the amount and
kind of assistance given; (3) the defendant's absence or presence at the time of the tort; (4) his
relation to the tortious actor; (5) the defendant's state of mind; and (6) the duration of the
assistance provided. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
121. See Note, supra note 21, at 737-38, 740-41 (discussing the uncertain state of both
general aiding and abetting law and contributory infringement doctrine).
122. Mason, supra note 110, at 1157-58 (stating that only some courts recognize the sliding
scale approach).
123. E.g., In re Temporomandibular Joint Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495
(8th Cir. 1997); Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 802 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Witzman v.
Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999).
124. Combs, supranote 110, at 277-78.
125. E.g., Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929 (N.J. 2004).
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jurisdiction, 126 the type of party involved, 127 and the underlying tort at
28
issue.
Given all of these uncertainties, the Supreme Court's directive
to apply "rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law" is
ambiguous at best. 29 In actuality, aiding and abetting liability is not a
"well-established" precept that can adequately guide courts in
determining the outer limits of indirect liability. 30 Instead, it is a
somewhat amorphous doctrine that leaves tremendous discretion in
the hands of judges establishing binding precedent for future
contributory infringement cases. Given the uncertainty surrounding
aiding and abetting law, its application to contributory infringement
would tax even the efforts of intermediaries that lawfully interact
with intellectual property. Without more clarity as to the metes and
bounds of liability, technologists must plan for the worst, perhaps
shelving innovative products and services for fear of litigation.' 31 The
unsettled nature of aiding and abetting doctrine is just one reason to
be cautious in advocating the use of tort law principles to solve
32
indirect infringement claims.
B. Aiding and Abetting and Causation
There is one relatively constant component of aiding and
abetting law that deserves further discussion. Civil aiding and

126. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1975) (reviewing
cases from different jurisdictions that do and do not accept silence and inaction as a basis for
aiding and abetting liability).
127. E.g., Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1071-72 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (recognizing
qualified privilege for lawyers assisting in a client's breach of fiduciary duty to a third party).
128. For example, courts in Georgia, Maine, Montana, and Virginia refuse to recognize a
cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud. Mason, supranote 110, at 1139-40.
129. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-35 (2005).
130. Id. at 930 (stating that the doctrines of contributory and vicarious infringement have
"emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law").
131. See Brief for Innovation Scholars and Economists as Amici Curiae Supporting
Affirmance at 15-20, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
(No. 04-480), 2005 WL 520503 (noting chilling effects of current state of secondary liability
doctrine); Julie Zankel, Note, A Little Help with Sharing: A Mandatory Licensing Proposal to
Resolve the Unanswered Questions Surrounding Peer-to-PeerLiability for Contributory Copyright
Infringement in the Wake of Grokster, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 198 (2006) ("Any uncertainty
surrounding liability for contributory infringement that puts technology distributors and
innovators at risk certainly will chill innovation.").
132. Aside from the unsettled status of aiding and abetting doctrine, another reason to be
nervous about a wholesale importation of tort law standards to contributory infringement is
intellectual property's particular focus on innovation. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
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abetting law takes the assistance requirement quite seriously. 133
Thus, as one court held, "liability for aiding [and] abetting turns on
how much encouragement or assistance is substantial enough." 13 4 For
the substantial assistance analysis, tort law principles require, among
other things, a determination as to whether the defendant's action
caused the ultimate tort at issue. 13 5 Without evidence of a causal link
between the defendant and the wrongful activity, there can be no
liability for aiding and abetting. 136 This explicit analysis of causation
is lacking in most of the contributory infringement cases.
Courts adjudicating contributory infringement disputes should
undertake a more strenuous causation analysis for a number of
reasons. First, even if the specific concepts involved are sometimes
difficulty to apply, causation, to a certain extent, is intuitive. 37 Many
to locate their explanation of causation in
theorists have tried
"common sense."' 38 A law loses its effectiveness when its subjects
cannot appreciate or understand its rational force.139 By tethering
liability for the infringing acts of another to causation, courts can offer
an explanation of contributory infringement liability that more closely
maps onto social expectations of fairness and blame.
Second, a factual causation requirement trains the factfinder's
attention in one area. The modern material contribution requirement's
ambiguity and breadth means that it serves as a grab bag for all sorts
of potential mechanisms for determining responsibility. A narrower

133. See Combs, supra note 110, at 288 ('Typically, the primary issue in a case of civil
aiding and abetting is whether the assistance or encouragement was substantial.").
134. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
135. Combs, supra note 110, at 292. In the criminal context, the accomplice's contribution is
not scrutinized in this manner. See Bartholomew, supra note 29, at 830-31.
136. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Release & Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 736 (7th Cir. 2007); Metge
v. Bachler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc.,
490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1979)) (holding that there must be a "substantial causal
connection between the culpable conduct of the alleged aider and abettor and the harm to the
plaintiff'); see also Combs, supra note 110, at 292.
137. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A Study in the Interpretationof
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 332 (1985); see also Jon Hanson & Ana Reyes, Attributional
Positivism: The Naive Psychology Behind Our Laws (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (describing the widespread urge among human beings to make causal attributions
and, at times, attributions of responsibility and blame).
138. E.g., Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (1997);
John Sherman Myers, Causation and Common Sense, 5 U. MIAMI L.Q. 238, 238-39 (1951).
139. As of late, intellectual property law has been particularly criticized for being out of step
with public sentiment. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the
Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537 (2007); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright
Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731,
773-74 (2003).
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focus would promote greater consistency and predictability. We
acknowledge that causation should not become the be all and end all
of contributory infringement doctrine. 140 Yet, while allowing for
continued attention to issues of public policy and contributory
infringement's knowledge requirement, an explicit factual causation
requirement would promote greater attention to the complex factual
settings of intellectual property disputes. As one tort law authority
notes, causal analysis is difficult enough without judges being
14 1
simultaneously sidetracked by other concerns.
Third, judges should have a certain amount of comfort in
investigating causation in intellectual property cases because of its
prevalence in so many areas of the law. 142 By reemphasizing the need
for causal analysis in contributory infringement, judges can utilize
reasoning that has been developed in toxic tort, 143 employment
discrimination, 1 44 refugee law, 145 criminal procedure, 146 and a host of
other legal subject matters. Below, we describe in more detail exactly
what is involved in the causal analysis of aiding and abetting liability.
This analysis can be split into two categories: cause in fact and
proximate cause.
1. Cause in Fact
Beginning in the 1920s, causal analysis in tort underwent a
significant change. At that time, scholars began to criticize many
areas of judicial doctrine as irrational abstractions that could be
manipulated by judges.1 47 These scholars, later dubbed Legal Realists,
were upset that the abstractions often obscured the true reasons

140. See infra Part III.
141. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 409 (2000).

142. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 307 (2d ed. 1985); see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 467 (6th ed. 1995) ('These issues of
causation, moreover, form an indispensable element of every tort case, regardless of its
underlying theory of liability.").
143. E.g., Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 366-67 (3d Cir. 1990).

144. Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII. Making Sense of Causation
in DisparateTreatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489 (2006). For an innovative call for the adoption of a
new causal framework for evaluating civil rights litigation, see D. James Greiner, Causal
Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARv. L. REV. 533 (2008).

145. Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee
Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265 (2002).
146. Eric A. Johnson, Causal Relevance in the Law of Search and Seizure, 88 B.U. L. REV.
113 (2008).

147. Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation:Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration,and Social
Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 64 (1978).
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behind judicial outcomes. 148 A better legal paradigm would force
judges to affirmatively state the ideological beliefs motivating their

decisions. 149
One target of the Realist attack was the doctrine of causation.
The Realists contended that judges used the term "causation" in an
inconsistent manner, sometimes referring to the actual effects of the
defendant's conduct on the plaintiff and sometimes referring to
whether the scope of the law encompassed or should encompass the
defendant's conduct. 1 0 This inconsistency obscured the judge's
normative decisions about the law's reach under scientific sounding
language. 151 Instead of explicitly limiting the scope of liability on
public policy grounds, an appeal to "causation" made it sound as if the
decision against liability was based on ineluctable physical principles.
The solution, according to legal scholar Leon Green, was a
separation of the causation inquiry into two parts. Judges should
evaluate both "factual" causation and "proximate" causation, but keep
these two evaluations separate-the former referring to the
examination of the effects of the defendant's conduct on the tortious
event and the latter referring to the normative considerations that
had been camouflaged under the previous regime.15 2 Green wanted
public policy concerns to be brought out into the open, and his solution
became the accepted position in U.S. tort law.1 53 Today, the division
across the whole of
between factual cause and proximate cause applies
1 54
tort law, including aiding and abetting doctrine.
Factual causation addresses empirical questions of causal
connection. Did the failure to equip a boat with life preservers lead to
the victim's death by drowning? 155 Did the pharmaceutical marketed
by the defendant to pregnant mothers produce congenital
deformities? 1 56 Did a defectively manufactured seat belt result in the
plaintiffs death from a car crash? 157 To arrive at answers to these and
related questions, courts use a few different tests, which we will
148. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 470-71 (1988).
149. Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by "Causation"in the Law, 73 Mo. L. REV.
433, 456 (2008).
150. Leon Green, CausalRelation in Legal Liability-In Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 513, 534 (1927).
151. Stapleton, supra note 149, at 457.
152. Green, supra note 150, at 534.
153. DOBBS, supra note 141, at 409.
154. See Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963, 969 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 for the proposition that the same analysis of "legal
causation" applies for both aiding and abetting claims and general negligence claims).
155. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920).
156. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986).
157. See Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104, 106 (S.D. 1973).
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describe in more detail in Part III. But at the heart of the analysis,
regardless of the test used, is the use of counterfactuals. The trier of
fact must compare what did occur with what would have occurred if a
hypothetical, counterfactual situation had existed. 158 In other words,
the judge or jury must imagine a world where the boat had life
preservers, the mothers did not ingest the pharmaceutical, and the
seat belt was manufactured in a different way. This evaluation of
cause applies not only to positive acts undertaken by the defendant,
but also to passive conduct that may have played a necessary role in
159
the plaintiffs injury.
In the context of aiding and abetting's substantiality
requirement, courts look to the causal effects of the defendant's
behavior. 160 Some courts even equate the substantiality test with
causation1 61 and require that the plaintiff plead facts demonstrating
that the aider-abettor "caused the harm on which the primary liability
is predicated."'162 The six-factor test for aiding and abetting liability
probes both the knowledge requirement and the causality of the
defendant's actions. For example, in determining whether the live-in
girlfriend of a burglar should be contributorily liable for a killing that
occurred during one of her boyfriend's burglaries, the D.C. Circuit
evaluated "the amount and kind of assistance given" and the duration
of the assistance provided. 63 Both of these factors are meant to
scrutinize the effect of the defendant's actions on the primary
wrongdoer. In other words, courts investigate the interaction between
the defendant and the primary wrongdoer to figure out whether the
defendant actually caused the wrongdoer to commit the wrongful act.
Looking at these factors, the court concluded that the girlfriend's
actions were an "essential part" of the activity that resulted in a
wrongful death. 64 Notably, this is a more complicated determination
of cause than in the typical tort context. Instead of examining the
direct effects of the defendant's behavior on the victim, the trier of fact
assesses the aiding and abetting defendant's role in the victim's injury
through the activities of another human being.

158. KEETON ETAL., supra note 107, § 41.
159. Id.
160. See Mason, supra note 110, at 1158 ("Causation is an essential element of an aiding
and abetting claim.").
161. E.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. 2007) (en
banc).
162. Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
163. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
164. Id. at 488.
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2. Proximate Cause
Separate from the analysis of factual causation is the question
of proximate cause. 165 Proximate cause provides a court with some
leeway even after determining that the defendant's conduct factually
caused the plaintiffs injury. 166 It is regularly invoked in aiding and
abetting cases. 167 Determining what exactly is involved in an
assessment of proximate cause is tricky, however. Proximate cause is
sometimes described as an analysis of foreseeability. 168 But it
incorporates a host of other considerations. For example, courts have
examined the temporality of the defendant's act under proximate
cause, suggesting that acts immediately preceding the plaintiffs
injury are proximate, but ones further back in time are not. 169 Others
argue that social justice principles are embedded within proximate
cause, ameliorating the unforgiving logic of factual causation. 170 At its
heart, the proximate cause analysis asks a court to make a normative
decision as to the proper scope of liability. 171 William Prosser, the
preeminent scholar of U.S. tort law, defined proximate cause as "our
172
more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands."'
Courts evaluating aiding and abetting claims often must assess
whether imposing liability would endanger an important type of
relationship. Despite sufficient evidence of substantial assistance,
judge-made exceptions exist for special relationships that need legal
protection. Thus, courts tend to be more exacting in evaluating the
substantial assistance requirement when a liability rule risks
damaging an important social or familial relationship, like the

165.
166.
167.
(8th Cir.

Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 60 (1956).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, § 42, at 272-73.
E.g., In re Temporomandibular Joint Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1496
1997); In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 2d 775, 807 (N.D. Ohio

2007).
168. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Am. Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1977); see also Boim v.
Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir.

2002) ("Foreseeability is the cornerstone of proximate cause .... ").
169. See Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, The Katrina Disaster,
Prosser'sFolly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LoY. L. REV. 1,
12-18 (2008).

170. See Danielle Conway-Jones, Factual Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: A
Philosophical View of Proofand Certainty in UncertainDisciplines, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 875, 88889 (2002) (arguing that, for instance, "[tihe 'substantial factor' test, implicitly recognizes that
fairness and justice cannot always be resolved with surgical precision").
171. Malone, supra note 165, at 97-98.
172. KEETON ETAL., supranote 107, at 264.
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relationship between husband and wife, 173 parent and child,174 or even
175
the relationship between a subsidiary and parent corporation
Similarly, aiding and abetting rules have been bent when evaluating
the conduct of particular social groups likely to evoke judicial
sympathies. 176 Thus, an attorney's aiding and abetting liability for
breach of a fiduciary duty involves its own complex framework, which
is generally more amenable to a defendant than standard aiding and
abetting law. 177 When recognizing that the defendant has a particular
relationship with the direct tortfeasor that calls for an adjusted
liability standard, courts typically address this up front, stating their
reasoning on public policy grounds rather than folding the analysis
178
into their discussion of factual causation.
C. CausalAnalysis in ContributoryInfringement Doctrine
As it currently stands, unlike the law of aiding and abetting,
the law of contributory infringement does not have an explicit
causation requirement. However, in construing the material
contribution standard, courts do sometimes reference causal
18 0 "causal chain,'' l
language. 179 Words and phrases like "causes,"
"furthered the tortious conduct," 18 2 and "supplied the ammunition that
173. E.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Duke v. Feldman, 226
A.2d 345, 348 (Md. 1967).
174. E.g., Kilgus v. Kilgus, 495 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
father's suggestion to son that he douse cook-out fire with lighter fluid, which resulted in serious
burns to his wife, was not substantial assistance).
175. E.g., In re Temporomandibular Joint Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 880 F. Supp. 1311,
1319-20 (D. Minn. 1995).
176. See Mark Bartholomew, Contributory Infringers and Good Samaritans, 3 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 11-12 (2009) (describing the courts' special solicitude for pregnant women,
psychiatrists, and military personnel).
177. See Kevin Bennardo, The Tort of Aiding and Advising?: The Attorney Exception to
Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 84 N.D. L. REV. 85, 88-90 (2008); see also, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1069-72 (Or. 2006); Alpert v. Crain, 178 S.W.3d 398, 405-06
(Tex. App. 2005).
178. See, e.g., Hallett v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 850 F. Supp. 874, 879 (D. Nev. 1994); Jupin v.
Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 838 (Mass. 2006); Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
179. For example, in evaluating the liability of a generic drug maker for contributory patent
infringement, the court noted that it had to evaluate whether the titration instructions posted on
the generic drug "will cause infringement," i.e., result in the generic drug patient replicating a
patented method for administering anti-asthma drugs. AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 623 F.
Supp. 2d 579, 599-601 (D.N.J. 2009).
180. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 791 (5th Cir. 1999).
181. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2007).
182. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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allowed.., the infringement" 18 3 are all found in the contributory
infringement jurisprudence. Yet, in defining material contribution,
courts simultaneously invoke both causation and other liability
standards. For example, courts frequently quote the "classic
statement" of contributory infringement liability from a 1971 case,
which instructs that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another" is contributorily liable.18 4 It is impossible to tell
from this statement whether the court should base liability on the
defendant's mental state, complicity, or causal relationship with the
act of infringement. The result is a particular type of judicial
decisionmaking that makes causation an optional trump card to be
invoked or ignored as the judge sees fit.
Overall, judges give causation relatively little attention in
deciding these cases. Although "[i]t is 'black letter' law that tort
liability requires proof of causation,"18 5 many contributory
86
infringement cases are decided without any causal analysis at all.
Even if the court does mention causation, the causal analysis usually
becomes confused with other issues of responsibility so that it is often
impossible to determine what causal tests were actually used. For
example, in one case, the Northern District of Ohio held that the
defendant operators of an online bulletin board "clearly induced,
caused, and materially contributed" to the infringement. 8 7 But the
court's analysis of causation was unclear. Apparently the operators'
conduct caused the posting of infringing content owned by Playboy
magazine because the operators encouraged users of the bulletin

183. Sly Magazine, LLC v. Weider Publ'ns L.L.C., 241 F.R.D. 527, 530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(citing Power Test Petroleum Distribs., Inc. v. Manhattan & Queens Fuel Corp., 556 F. Supp.
392, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
184. E.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971)) (emphasis added); see also e.g., Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963,
975 (9th Cir. 1981); Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077, 1090 (D. Md. 1995);
Constr. Prods. Corp. v. Hahn Builders, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 639, 640 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
185. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2008).
186. See, e.g., Symantec Corp. v. CD Micro, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1283 (D. Or. 2003)
(finding contributory infringement based on defendant's act of supplying a product knowing the
recipient is using the product to engage in trademark infringement); Sony Computer Entm't Am.,
Inc. v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (analyzing contributory
infringement based on defendant's knowledge that third parties used defendant's product to
infringe plaintiffs trademark). At other times, causal references are made but the analysis is
rudimentary. E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Ram Distrib., LLC, 625 F. Supp. 2d 674, 684 (E.D. Wis.
2008); Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
187. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 514 (N.D. Ohio
1997).
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board to upload information. 8 8 However, the court did not explain
why it thought that the operators' generalized encouragement
resulted in the posting of specific copyrighted images. 8 9 While
encouragement may sometimes result in a particular behavior, it
oftentimes does not. 190 Moreover, the bulletin board operators only
encouraged generalized posting of information by subscribers, not the
posting of adult-themed content, and certainly not the specific posting
of images from Playboy magazine.1 91
To the extent courts evaluating contributory infringement do
engage in a more rigorous analysis of causation, they are struggling in
a number of areas and could use further guidance. When contributory
infringement cases only involved manufacturers or distributors of
infringing items, or supplies for infringing items, the courts' task was
not so difficult. Undisputed evidence that the defendant provided the
essential ingredient for infringement-the infringing good itselfmade it unnecessary to engage in a lengthy causal analysis. But once
judicial tinkering over the last two decades unleashed the contributory
infringement doctrine beyond manufacturers and distributors,
questions of causation became more complex. Now contributory
defendants may assist the infringer without supplying the infringing
item. For instance, online entrepreneurs generate new commercial
arenas where infringement can take place. As illustrated below, this
change has left the courts confused on a number of issues. First,
counter to the teachings of tort law, recent contributory infringement
decisions comingle factual causation and proximate cause, making for
imprecise analysis and a potential cover for judicial biases. Second,
recent cases inconsistently evaluate the causal effect of the
defendant's provision of an environment where infringement can
occur.
1. Failure to Separate Factual from Proximate Causation
A big problem with current assessment of the material
contribution requirement is that courts conflate factual with
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. In fact, as our experience with small children reveals time and again, mere
encouragement often falls on deaf ears. Tantrums Times Two, HANK & CLARA'S BIG ADVENTURE,
http:/fhankandclara.blogspot.com/2009/10/tantrums-times-two.html (Oct. 28, 2009).
191. Russ Hardenburgh,982 F. Supp. at 514. It is instructive to compare this set of facts
with the situation in the Grokster case where the defendant not only provided a technology
suitable for generalized file sharing, but specifically "voiced the objective that recipients use [its
software] to download copyrighted works." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 913, 924 (2005).
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proximate causation. The ambiguous nature of proximate cause makes
it easy to confuse the two concepts. Because of this, one could argue
that proximate cause should have no role in establishing the
materiality of the defendant's conduct. Some scholars of tort law
contend that reliance on proximate cause principles is really a
doctrinal smokescreen for using ad hoc public policy justifications to
determine whether the substantial contribution standard has been
satisfied.192 Foreseeability, often a part of the proximate cause
analysis, is an amorphous concept, subject to manipulation by the
trier of fact. 193 And the principles of "social justice" embedded in
proximate cause offer judges little guidance in determining the
liability of contributory infringers.' 94 Many scholars would contend
that Congress can handle the evaluation of policy issues better than
the courts. 195 This may be particularly true for assessments of indirect
liability, which involve an added layer of complexity when compared
to the standard liability scenario involving only a single perpetrator
and a single victim. 1 96 Thus, it may be argued that to the extent tort
law's proximate cause principles are being imported into contributory
infringement law, they offer little aid to courts and litigants seeking
predictability.
On the other hand, courts evaluating infringement liability
probably need to take into account the various interests that are
encompassed within proximate cause. There is a role for the courts in
evaluating the larger consequences of particular behavior in particular
industries and then tailoring their decisions accordingly. Without
employing some noncausal theories as to proper limits on the scope of
liability, legal responsibility would extend almost indefinitely as

192.

See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 101-02

(expanded ed. 2003) (noting judicial use of proximate cause analysis to conceal the policy basis
for liability decisions).
193. In commenting on the precedent interpreting the substantial contribution requirement,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remarked that foreseeability is an "elusive" doctrine.
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also IZHAK ENGLARD, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 175 (1993) (describing foreseability as a normative analysis of the
proper scope of liability, not an objective test).
194. See William L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369, 369-74
(1950) (describing proximate cause as "a tangle and a jungle, a palace of mirrors and a maze...
[that] covers a multitude of sins [and] is a complex term of highly uncertain meaning under
which other rules, doctrines and reasons lie buried").
195. See Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality:The
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 115 (2008) (noting that legislatures
make policy while courts lack the institutional competence for such policy decisions).
196. Note, supranote 21, at 739 (noting that Congress's superiority over courts at balancing
complex policy issues is especially implicated when establishing secondary liability rules because
such rules must account for the interests of the perpetrator, the enabler, and the victim).
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grandparents would be liable for giving birth to the parents of
murderers. 197 Moreover, even seemingly factual inquiries often invoke
normative themes. 198 Most would agree that judges frequently apply
their own conceptions of good policy when rendering decisions
regardless of the subject matter. 199 Some use of public policy to set
limits on the scope of liability is unavoidable in the context of
200
contributory infringement, just as it is in other areas of the law.
Yet even if proximate cause does have its place in contributory
infringement law, tort law's explicit recognition of the difference
between proximate and factual causation would benefit contributory
infringement doctrine. 201 An unrecognized blending of public policy
arguments with causal analysis produces unclear decisions with
dangerous implications. As Leon Green demonstrated, early
twentieth-century judges used vague references to causal language to
evaluate both the defendant's involvement with the tortious event at
issue as well as to set boundaries on the scope of liability for reasons
that had nothing to do with the actual real world effects of the
defendant's conduct. 202 By contending that there had been a break in
the "chain of causation" or that the injury was not a "natural
consequence" or "proximate cause" of the defendant's action, these
judges obscured the normative and policy-based reasoning that

197. See HART & HONORE, supra note 142, at 7 (noting that a true scientific causal test for
liability would give absurd and unjust results). Some have tried to articulate a distinction
between but-for causes and "historical" but-for causes but this distinction is difficult to draw and
would offer little guidance to potential contributory infringers. See Linda Sandstrom Simard,
Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles of Specific Jurisdiction,38 IND. L. REV. 343, 357-60 (2005)
(commenting on the difficulties in distinguishing between "historical" but-for causes and but-for
causes).
198. Malone, supra note 165, at 97.
199. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 57 (1997).
200. In another article, one of us traces out several rules of thumb from tort law's proximate
cause analysis in cases involving judicial recognition of a duty to control the actions of third
parties and describes how those rules could be translated to contributory infringement. See
Bartholomew, supra note 176, at 21 (noting that a "special relationship" analysis of contributory
infringement based on general tort case law could provide much-needed additional legal content).
201. We do not wish to overstate the degree of success Green and the Legal Realists had in
convincing courts to bifurcate their analysis of factual and proximate cause. Even though these
two labels are routinely used, there is still a tendency confuse causal reasoning with other
reasoning. See Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 945 (2001) (discussing conflation of proximate and factual
cause in the Restatement (Second) of Torts). Nevertheless, tort law's attempt to
compartmentalize factual and proximate cause represents a great improvement over the
intermixing typical of recent contributory infringement decisions.
202. Leon Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 607
(1929); see also Stapleton, supra note 149, at 456 (noting Leon Green's observation that judges
used causal terminology to make limitation of liability decisions).
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motivated their decisions behind a screen of causal language. 20 3 For
Green, these faux-scientific rationales for liability decisions were just
"word magic whereby unprincipled limitation-of-liability decisions
could be achieved at will or whim by untrammeled judges."20 4 Green's
solution was to bifurcate study of the defendant's involvement with
the tortious conduct from the policy-based reasons for cabining
liability. 20 5 The value of Green's proposal was that by separating the
factual question of the defendant's involvement from the policy
be
arguments regarding liability, the policy arguments "could
20 6 Most
identified and evaluated for their normative soundness."
their analyses
courts came to agree with Green, specifically 2dividing
07
cause."
"proximate
and
causation"
into "factual
Yet courts evaluating the materiality of a contributory
infringement defendant's actions do not employ Green's two-part
framework; instead they, in effect, lump normative concerns with
analyses of factual causation. As an example of the way policyoriented concerns creep into the currently ambiguous material
contribution requirement, consider how the Ninth Circuit decided to
create a special gloss on the requirement for online actors. In
determining whether search engines should be responsible for the
infringing conduct of websites that post infringing images, the Ninth
Circuit emphasized the need to protect copyright holders from the
communicative potential of the internet. 20 8 According to the court in
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, material contribution must be analyzed
203. See Green, supra note 150, at 519, 533 (noting judges' general failure to candidly meet
the policy issues implicated in a particular case); Green, supra note 202, at 626 (stating that the
extremes of legal protection are hidden under causation terminology); see also Stapleton, supra
note 149, at 456-57 (stating that causal language obscured the real basis for many decisions).
204. David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority Among Institutional Decision Makers in
Louisiana State-CourtNegligence and Strict Liability Cases, 57 LA. L. REV. 1079, 1114 (1997).
205. Green, supra note 150, at 534.
206. Stapleton, supra note 149, at 457.
207. DOBBS, supra note 141, at 409. Admittedly, the term "proximate cause" is a confusing
one for an analysis that is meant to avoid considerations of factual causation. See Stapleton,
supra note 201, at 945 (proposing a renaming of "proximate cause" as the "scope of liability for
consequences of tortious conduct" determination); see also Richard W. Wright, Once More into the
Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution,and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1071, 1073-74 (2001) (criticizing the Restatement for using terminology that does not
adequately separate "the empirical issue of causal contribution from the normative issue of the
proper extent of legal responsibility for tortiously caused consequences"). Since Stapleton's
article, the American Law Institute has retitled the proximate cause determination as the "scope
of liability for consequences of breach." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL

AND EMOTIONAL HARM 574-75 (Proposed Final Draft, April, 6, 2005).
208. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2007)
(approving the development of secondary liability tests in the Internet context that account for
the scale and speed of online communication).
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more generously when online services are at issue given the internet's
ability to "significantly magnify the effects of otherwise immaterial
infringing activities."20 9 Because posting an infringing item online
allows for that item to be distributed on a massive scale, the court
explained that it needed to find contributory liability in order for
copyright holders "to protect their rights in a meaningful way." 210 As a
result, any contributory defendant operating online will automatically
be deemed to have made a material contribution to infringement if it
21 1
has failed to take "simple measures" to prevent infringement.
Even if the Amazon.com court is correct about the ramifications
of online infringement, it does not make sense to couch policy-based
arguments in terms of causation and materiality. The court contended
that it had to permit liability against Google because the search
engine's conduct was "material," and it emphasized the need for
materiality and "substantial" assistance to satisfy the material
contribution requirement. 212 It claimed that its new "simple measures"
standard for material contribution in the "context of cyberspace"
reflected the traditional analysis of whether the defendant "induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct." 21 3 The
Ninth Circuit also claimed that it was faithfully evaluating whether
the defendant "takes steps that are substantially certain" to result in
21 4
infringement, per the analysis of the Supreme Court in Grokster.
This is precisely the sort of conflation of policy and causal analysis
that Green protested and that tort law has worked to curb. Perhaps
the Amazon.com court was treating Google's causal role as a given and
focusing its efforts on proximate cause, but by using words like
"causes," "material," and "substantial" and by not acknowledging the
prudential underpinnings of its decision, it created a precedent that
sounded in the language of factual causation. One problem with such
a precedent based in the scientific sounding language of factual
causation is that it is extremely difficult to distinguish. By asserting
that any online service provider makes a material contribution to
infringement when it knows of infringing content on its system and
does not try to prevent it, the Amazon.com decision handcuffed the
Ninth Circuit when it came across an online business that it did not

209. Id. at 1172.

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.

213. Id. at
214. Id.

1171.
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wish to find liable: credit card providers. 2 15 The result was a tortured
majority opinion that tried to explain why online "location services"
are somehow material to infringement but online "payment services"
are not. 216 A better approach would have been to acknowledge that the
Amazon.com decision relied on public policy, not the "materiality" of
the search engine's conduct, and then explain, again on public policy
grounds, why online credit card services should not be part of the
"simple measures" rule for online contributory infringement. 2 17
The recent Tiffany v. eBay decision offers another example of
the blending of factual and proximate cause. In that case, the court
determined that eBay did materially contribute to the trademark
infringement of counterfeiters who posted their wares on the online
auction site. 218 The court ultimately found that eBay was not
contributorily liable because it did not have sufficient knowledge of
the infringing activity occurring on its site. 21 9 Yet in assessing eBay's
knowledge, the court performed some analysis that would be more
relevant to material contribution. The court inquired as to whether
eBay's efforts to detect and remediate trademark infringement on its
site were adequate. 2 20 The court appeared impressed by the various
steps eBay took to uncover fraud, including its program to remove
infringing listings once notified by the trademark owner and its own
internal fraud detection measures. 22 1 At the same time, the court
assessed the plaintiff trademark holder's efforts to prevent
counterfeiting throughout the opinion, spending numerous pages
discussing Tiffany's own strategies for rooting out infringement. 222 In
effect, the court tried to determine whether the plaintiff or eBay was
215. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We evaluate
[Plaintiff's] claims with an awareness that credit cards serve as the primary engine of electronic
commerce.").
216. See id. at 797 n.8 (reasoning that location services are more material to infringement
than payment services because they lead Internet users directly to infringing images and often
display them on the website of the service itself). For a case following Amazon.com to impose
liability on a provider of internet protocol addresses, see Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc
Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
217. These sorts of decisions, claiming not to be but actually based on policy, are not unique
to the intellectual property context. See James E. Viator, When Cause-in-FactIs More Than a

Fact: The Malone-Green Debate on the Role of Policy in Determining Factual Causation in Tort
Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1984) ("[O]nce ensnared in the tangled facts of hard cases,
factual cause often turns out, upon closer scrutiny, to be another species of cause entirely-legal
or proximate cause.").
218. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
219. Id. at 518.

220. Id. at 476-79.
221. See id. ("eBay has made substantial investments in anti-counterfeiting initiatives.").
222. Id. at 472-74, 481-85.
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the "cheapest cost avoider," that is, the party that could most
efficiently police the auction site for infringing content. 223 Such
evidence really has nothing to do with the contributory defendant's
knowledge or material contribution, but is instead related to the sort
of public policy assessment that is often undertaken under proximate
cause analysis. 224 A determination of which litigant is best positioned
to absorb the costs of protecting the plaintiff is a pure example of
using public policy arguments to determine the proper scope of
liability for a particular cause of action. 225 By not explicitly indicating
that it engaged in such a public policy analysis, the eBay decision has
the potential to import a new policy-oriented variable into the
material contribution evaluation that is irrelevant to factual
226
causation.
Finally, the courts openly disagree as to whether the presence
of intervening actors between the contributory defendant and the
direct infringer should prevent a finding of material contribution.
Multiple courts have explained that facilitation of infringement by
other entities that are more temporally related to the infringement
does not prevent finding that the defendant materially contributed as
well. 22 7 Several cases hold that corporate officers can materially
contribute to infringement despite channeling all of their actions
through an intermediary organization that interfaces with the direct

223. Id. at 518 ("Certainly, the evidence adduced at trial failed to prove that eBay was a
cheaper cost avoider than Tiffany with respect to policing its marks.").

224. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 103-04 (1975) (discussing specific court decisions where
consideration of the cheapest cost avoider appeared to influence the court's proximate cause
analysis).
225. See Dratler, supra note 102, at 33-36 (discussing use of cheapest cost avoider
determination in indirect infringement cases).
226. In an older example, a court found a material contribution because it was "foreseeable"
that advertising materials the defendant distributed to retailers would be used to infringe
another business's trademark. Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,
496 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). While foreseeability may have some bearing on whether the knowledge
standard has been satisfied, it does not have anything to do with factual causation. Antony
Honor6, Causation in the Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta
ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edularchives/fall2008/entrieslcausation-law/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2010). By not segregating the analysis of foreseeability from actual causation, the court offers a
confusing blend that distracts from the task of evaluating the real world impact of the
defendant's behavior.
227. See, e.g., AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 579, 604 (D.N.J. 2009)
(holding that drug manufacturer could be liable for patent infringement committed by
prescribing doctors); Corning Glass Works v. Jeannette Glass Co., 308 F. Supp. 1321, 1326-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (endorsing the view that contributory infringement turns on whether a
reasonable person in the defendant's position would realize that he had created a situation
affording an opportunity for wrong by the average person).
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infringer. 228 Yet in Visa, the court relied on "an additional step in the
causal chain" to find for the defendant credit card company,
explaining that there was no causation because, even though the
credit card company made infringing websites profitable, there still
had to be a decision by the websites and their users to engage in the
infringing conduct in the first place. 229 Similarly, other cases
emphasize that a sufficient degree of separation between the
defendant and the direct infringer immunizes the defendant from
230
causal responsibility.
Again, this is an example of a policy-based argument
masquerading as an even-handed assessment of factual causation. By
itself, the mediation of a defendant's action through several other
actors should not influence the causal analysis. The presence of
intervening steps is implicit in any causal model. 231 One would not
argue that smoking is not a cause of lung cancer because there is the
"additional step" of tar building up on the lungs before lung cancer
occurs. Similarly, one should not contend that credit card companies
do not cause infringement just because there is the intervening step of
a website patron electing to use his credit card. The Visa dissent had
it right in contending that "materiality turns on how significantly the
activity helps infringement, not on whether [it is] characterized as one

step or two steps removed from it."232
Admittedly, at times it may seem as if an entity is so far
removed from the ultimate wrongful activity that the entity should not
be held accountable even if it did factually cause the wrongful activity
to occur. But that is a decision that is made under a proximate cause
analysis. 233 Not every entity that causes a harm is responsible for that
harm. As every first-year law student knows after reading the
Palsgrafcase, despite a demonstrated causal link with the plaintiffs
injury, a defendant may still avoid liability if the injury was
unforeseeable or did not fall under the defendant's duty of care. 23 4 The
228. E.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Applera Corp. v. MJ Research, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 459, 461-63 (D. Conn. 2004).
229. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2007).
230. See, e.g., Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten, No. C06-210MJP, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 51252, at *23-24 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2007) (refusing to impose liability on
manufacturer for lack of country of origin marking because manufacturer had no control over
where the products it sold to a French distributor were eventually sold); Demetriades v.
Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to impose contributory liability
because the contributory defendant was too "attenuated" from the act of copyright infringement).
231. JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE 132 (2d ed. 2009).

232. Visa, 494 F.3d at 812 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
233. Honor6, supra note 226, at §3.2.
234. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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Palsgraf railroad employee's push of a passenger onto a train,
dislodging her package of fireworks, which exploded and brought down
a structure that injured the plaintiff, clearly caused the plaintiffs
injury.235 It did not matter that other events-the movement of the
train, the passenger's movement, the passenger's decision to acquire
fireworks, the movement of the plaintiff, the explosion, the placement
of the structure-all transpired before the injury occurred. 236 In fact,
the railroad employee's action was so obviously a factual cause that
the Palsgraf court skipped ahead to questions of duty and
237
foreseeability that can only be resolved on policy-based grounds.
Deciding cases on these grounds is not objectionable in itself;
determining the scope of legal responsibility, apart from factual
238
causation, can be described as "the fundamental policy of the law."
After the reforms of the Legal Realists, what is objectionable is failing
to demark such reasoning from causal analysis. The decisions
described in this Section are flawed because they employ the language
of factual causation to make policy-based judgments to exempt select
businesses from contributory liability for online infringement.
It is debatable whether or not it makes sense to hold
defendants involved with e-commerce to a higher standard than other
contributory defendants. While the internet has increased the ability
of infringers to copy and distribute illegal content, the impact of
liability rules on entities like eBay and Google, which help the web
run efficiently, also needs to be taken into account. But more striking
to us is the way in which public policy based arguments become
intertwined with the factual causation analysis that is also part of the
material contribution requirement. A better approach would be to
segregate the analysis into three components: knowledge, causal
contribution, and public policy. A regime that forces judges to spell out
when they are speaking under the guise of factual causation versus
reasons of public policy will help keep the decisionmaking process
honest. It will also avoid the natural tendency over time for public
policy justifications, which subsequent experience may disprove, to
become blurred with decisions based on irrefutable causative
principles.

235. Id. at 99.
236. See id.
237. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, at 281 (noting that the existence of a "duty" giving
rise to legal responsibility is a matter of policy); WHITE, supra note 192, at 101 ("Palsgrafthus

marked.., the emergence of conceptions of causation as an issue of public policy.").
238. KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, at 281.
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2. Causal Analysis for Failures to Act
In addition to separating factual from proximate cause,
contributory infringement would profit from another causal rule
developed in tort law's scrutiny of aiding and abetting liability.
Currently, courts disagree as to whether merely creating an
opportunity to infringe satisfies the material contribution
requirement. In at least some of the cases, one can sense judicial
unease at the prospect of finding a material contribution without a
specific act that propels the infringement forward. Of course, creating
an online environment that permits infringement to take place might
be viewed as such an act, but these cases reveal a judgment that such
behavior is too passive to be material. One court recently explained
that "merely providing the opportunity to infringe is not a material
contribution." 239 Similarly, a court wrestling with the secondary
liability of a website for content posted on third-party websites
concluded that the website did not materially contribute. 240 Even
though the defendant placed a notice on its website that the infringing
content was available online and provided specific instructions on how
to find that content, the court concluded that more affirmative conduct
24 1
was needed.
Despite inconsistent treatment, the trend has been to deem
causally responsible those who create an online environment where
infringement can occur. 242 It is now accepted doctrine in many courts
that providing the "site and facilities" or "environment and market"
the material contribution
satisfies
activity
for infringing
requirement. 243 While this may be somewhat uncontroversial in the
239. R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 619 F. Supp. 2d 39, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Livnat v.
Lavi, No. 96 CIV. 4967(RWS), 1998 WL 43221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1998) ("Participation
sufficient to establish a claim of contributory infringement may not consist of merely providing
the 'means to accomplish an infringing activity.'" (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984))).
240. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293
(D. Utah 1999).
241. Id. at 1292-93. The court did find, however, that based on this conduct the defendant
was contributorily liable for the directly infringing activity of those who browsed the infringing
content on the other websites. Id. at 1294-95.
242. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
243. See Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Plroviding the
site and facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability.");
Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that
the material contribution requirement is satisfied where defendant provides the site and
facilities or the environment and market for infringing activity); Jalbert v. Gratuski, 554 F.
Supp. 2d 57, 72 (D. Mass. 2008) ("Knowingly providing the site and facilities for infringing
activities can [satisfy the material contribution requirement], when coupled with a failure to stop
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case of online file distribution services that facilitate the sharing of
copyrighted content, this reasoning has been extended to other actors,
including a search engine, 244 online auction house, 245 the proprietor of
a computer fair, 246 an internet age verification service, 247 and someone
who registered various screen names for use by another in an online
forum, but never posted any messages himself.248 In many of these
cases, an online actor simply created a forum in which all manner of
conduct could take place and then passively allowed all those different
types of conduct to occur.
Aiding and abetting's causation doctrine offers a solution to
this schism in the contributory infringement cases. One interesting
difference between causal analysis in most tort actions and causal
analysis in the specific context of aiding and abetting is that courts
are more reluctant in the latter situation to infer causation from
passive conduct.2 49 Liability for passive behavior was slow to receive
any recognition in tort law. 250 It first was extended only to those who
were regarded to have undertaken a duty to give service to the
public. 251 Then such liability came to be imposed on anyone who had
undertaken to perform a contract and failed to do so. 252 And now, as
W. Page Keeton observed, "[d]uring the last century, liability for
'nonfeasance' has been extended still further to a limited group of
relations in which custom, public sentiment and views of social policy
2 53
have led the courts to find a duty of affirmative action."
specific instances of infringement once knowledge of the infringing activity is acquired); Arista
Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. 03-2670(JBS), 2006 WL 842883, at *15 (D.N.J. Mar. 31,
2006) (holding that material contribution only requires providing an environment and market for
infringing activity).
244. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2007).
245. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 474, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
246. Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1046, 1055-56 (C.D. Cal.
2001).
247. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1158, 1170-71 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
248. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Gahary, 196 F. Supp. 2d 401, 404, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
249. See, e.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 485 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing
varied judicial responses); Glidden Co. v. Jandernoa, 5 F. Supp. 2d 541, 556 (W.D. Mich. 1998)
(holding that absent a relationship giving rise to a duty of disclosure, silence alone does not
satisfy aider and abettor liability); Mason, supra note 110, at 1157 (noting that "[m]ere inaction
...usually is insufficient to give rise to aider-abettor liability").
250. KEETON ETAL., supra note 107, at 373.
251. Id.; see also Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 218-20 (1908) (discussing early cases supporting a duty of active
care on business and property owners).
252. KEETON ETAL., supranote 107, at 373-74.
253. Id. Nevertheless, courts continue to rely on the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance in some situations. See Michael D. Green, Not so Fast-Appreciating the Role of
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Despite this expansion, courts continue to hesitate to impose
liability in the absence of any affirmative conduct by an aiding and
abetting defendant. Although liability for omissions does exist in the
aiding and abetting jurisprudence, courts impose such liability
reluctantly. Merely having the ability to stop tortious conduct and
failing to act is usually not enough to satisfy the substantial
assistance requirement. 25 4 Hence, no liability was found for the failure
of a manufacturer of welding rods to warn the plaintiff about the
health consequences of exposure to fumes during the welding process.
The court emphasized that the substantial assistance requirement
demands some "positive tortious activity" such as specifically
communicating that the rods would not cause harm. 255 In most cases,

the action of the defendant, in and of itself, must be wrongful before
liability is triggered. 256 For example, a brokerage firm was not held
257
responsible for the fraudulent actions of one of its account holders.
By registering with the brokerage firm, the defendant account holder
was able to invest in U.S. commodities and futures markets. Although
customers of the account holder complained to the brokerage firm and
asked that the defendant be stopped by liquidating their accounts, the
brokerage firm took no action. Such a failure to act, the court
substantial assistance in the
concluded, was not enough to constitute 258
account holder's breach of fiduciary duty.
Thus, aiding and abetting law suggests that merely creating an
environment where infringement takes place should not itself be
enough to result in liability. 25 9 For some reason, this principle has
Traditional Tort Law in Mass and Toxic Torts, 78 U.S.L.W. 2359 (Dec. 22, 2009), available at
2009 WL 4895645 (noting distinction in asbestos cases).
254. Combs, supra note 110, at 289 ("The possibility of silence or inaction giving rise to
aiding and abetting liability, however, makes courts and commentators queasy."); see also
Patrick J. McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and Abetting by Silence or Inaction:
An Unfounded Doctrine,29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 15, 22 (1993) (noting "reluctance of courts to...
impose aiding and abetting liability for 'nonaffirmative' conduct").
255. Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 1:04-CV-18948, 2007 WL 3399721, at *7 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 13, 2007).
256. See, e.g., In re Machinery, Inc., 342 B.R. 790, 799 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006) (noting that
the defendant's action must be independently tortious under Missouri law and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts).
257. Kolbeck v. LIT Am., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
258. Id. at 247 ("[I]naction, or a failure to investigate, constitutes actionable participation
only when a defendant owes a fiduciary duty directly to the plaintiff.").
259. Although the reasoning behind this limitation on the substantial assistance
requirement is rarely discussed or even acknowledged in the case law, it appears that the
underlying rationale is based on the value placed on individual freedom. The law distrusts rules
that force people to curb their behavior based on potential harms committed by others. See
DOBBS, supra note 141, at 853-55; see also Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369, 391 (1997) (discussing limitations on criminal liability for omissions).
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been ignored in recent decisions expanding infringement liability for
online businesses. 260 Yet there is no reason why a presumption against
liability should not formally apply for contributory infringement
defendants just as it does for accused aiders and abettors. Even if
there may be situations where glaring omissions in the face of specific
knowledge of infringement should satisfy the material contribution
standard, an explicitly stated presumption would help harmonize the
cases and force courts to offer cogent reasoning why the presumption
261
is being discarded for a particular defendant.
In sum, the way courts currently address causation in material
contribution analysis is problematic. First, causation garners little
consideration in contributory infringement cases. We believe it
deserves more attention. Second, to the extent it is considered, courts
do not do enough to segregate policy considerations from causality.
Instead, personal conceptions of which party can best police the
marketplace and the resilience of incentives for intellectual property
creation are surreptitiously integrated into the analysis of the
materiality of the contributory defendant's conduct. Tort law instructs
that analyses of factual causation and proximate causation should be
kept separate. Third, causal events are treated inconsistently, with
courts disagreeing as to the effect of the defendant's provision of an
opportunity for infringement. The good news is that these are exactly
the kinds of issues that tort law's causation rules already address. Use
of causal principles already employed in many other areas of the law
will help judges come up with reasoned answers for deciding the
liability of a contributory infringement defendant.
III. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND A MORE PRECISE ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTORY
INFRINGEMENT CAUSATION

For the reasons outlined in Part II, contributory infringement
doctrine can profit from closer attention to traditional rules in tort law
for evaluating the causal responsibility of aiders and abettors. Greater
260. Of course, the line between misfeasance and nonfeasance may be difficult to draw.
Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parentsto Protect Minor Children, 51
VILL. L. REV. 311, 311 n.1 (2006). Nevertheless, courts continue to employ the distinction in
determining tortious liability. See David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient
Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 MICH. L. REV. 277, 308 (2009) (discussing

analytical conceptions of the nonfeasance-misfeasance distinction).
261. In another article, one of us describes how, after causation has been determined, tort
law precedents regarding the creation of an environment where a tort can occur could be used to
assess the proper scope of liability for contributory infringement defendants. Bartholomew,
supra note 176, at 13, 19-20. This Article emphasizes that such precedents involve an analysis of
proximate cause, not cause in fact.
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awareness of these methods of causal analysis would improve the
quality and predictability of contributory infringement decisions. Yet
simply transplanting the traditional models of causation developed in
tort law to contributory infringement does not go far enough. Instead,
contributory infringement law can benefit from the more developed
causal modeling employed in the field of epidemiology.
Epidemiological methods may seem like an odd choice for
solving the problems of contributory infringement. Normally, there is
little synergy between medical and legal analytical models. 2 62 The
Supreme Court has commented on the differences between the "quest
' 263
for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory."
Nevertheless, law can learn a great deal from the development of
causal theory within epidemiology even when health related issues are
not primary. Both medicine and law concern themselves with
recreating events in an analytically rigorous manner to gain a deeper
on
understanding of phenomena. 264 Epidemiology's reliance
observational data and limited use of experimental evidence as
compared to other traditional sciences has forced the field to deal head
on with frameworks for causal analysis. 265 Just as medical researchers
examine the interplay between genetic factors, environmental
triggers, and personal choices on disease, judges and juries must sort
out the interplay of the different parties and circumstances involved in
a tortious act.
To understand why importing traditional legal causation rules
will not solve contributory infringement's problems, one must be
familiar with the specific mechanisms used to assess causation in U.S.
tort law. Tort law has come up with two basic ways to assess factual
causation: the "but-for" test and the "substantial factor" test. In this
Part, we describe both of these tests, show how they have been used in
contributory infringement law, and trace out their deficiencies. We
also describe epidemiology's framework for determining causation,
presenting actual investigations of public health initiatives that
incorporate this framework.
262. Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, The Uneasy Relationship Between Science
and Law: An Essay and Introduction,73 BROOK. L. REV. 847, 848 (2008).
263. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993).
264. Honor6, supra note 226; see also Mark Parascandola & Douglas L. Weed, Causation in
Epidemiology, 55 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 905, 905 (2001) (discussing centrality
of causation to practice of epidemiology).
265. Clinical trials do play an important role in epidemiology that we do not mean to
minimize. See, e.g., STEVEN PIANTADOSI, CLINICAL TRIALS: A METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 18
(1997) (discussing uses for clinical trials within epidemiological research). Rather, this Article
highlights the methods for making nonexperimental causal inferences contributed by
observational epidemiology and their relevance to legal tests of causality.
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Modern epidemiology offers three prescriptions for improving
contributory infringement's causal analysis. First, the trier of fact
must evaluate entire causal mechanisms rather than individual
actions. Second, questions of general causation must be segregated
from questions of specific causation. Finally, for any action potentially
identified as causal, a proper referent must be explicitly assigned. As
illustrated below, attention to these three nuances in causal theory
could go a long way to improving the quality of contributory
infringement decisions.
A. Problems of Overdeterminationand Multifactor Causation:
The Need to Evaluate Entire CausalMechanisms
As the H1N1 pandemic swept from country to country, health
officials began devising plans to combat its spread. It quickly became
apparent that no single measure would be adequate. To prevent
deaths from the disease, officials developed a two-prong strategy,
seeking to both cordon off existing outbreaks and to mitigate their
severity.266 To fulfill that strategy, a number of new practices needed
to be introduced simultaneously to reduce infection rates. For
example, hospitals implemented new procedures, acting more quickly
to relieve sick healthcare workers, formally monitoring workers for
compliance with hand-washing and cough etiquette protocols, and
rapidly testing and isolating those patients suspected of carrying the
virus. 267 Vaccination represented another critical step in limiting
H1N1. 268 None of these measures in themselves ended the pandemic,
but, together, they helped staunch the outbreak.
The variety of measures used to contain the HINI virus
reveals an important truth about causation: multiple events can
produce the same outcome. Tort law has largely failed to incorporate
this truth into its tests for causation. In this Section, we describe the
two main tests for factual causation developed in U.S. law-the "butfor" test and the "substantial factor" test-and describe their
shortcomings. The "but-for" test immunizes defendants who can
successfully maintain that the plaintiffs injury would have occurred

266. Carlos Franco-Paredes et al., The First Influenza Pandemic in the New Millennium:
Lessons Learned Hitherto for Current Control Efforts and Overall Pandemic Preparedness,7 J.
IMMUNE BASED THERAPIES & VACCINES, Aug. 7, 2009, at 2, 2-5.
267. V.C.C. Cheng et al., Prevention of Nosocomial Transmission of Swine-Origin Pandemic
Influenza Virus A/HIN1 by Infection Control Bundle, 74. J. HOSP. INFECTION 271, 273 (2010).

268. Helena C. Maltezou, Novel (Pandemic) Influenza A HIN1 in Healthcare Facilities:
Implications for Prevention and Control, 42 SCANDINAVIAN J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 412, 415

(2010).
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even if they had not acted. The substantial factor test potentially
corrects this problem, but at the cost of introducing a legal test devoid
of predictive content. We then describe how the epidemiologist
determines causal effect, not by scrutinizing isolated events, but by
studying entire causal mechanisms. This approach, known as the
Sufficient Component Cause framework, permits causation for a
particular act to be found even when the act's removal does not
prevent the studied outcome from occurring. It also offers the scientist
a more rigorous framework for determining causation than a
subjective assessment of whether the act was "substantial." Using the
case of Perfect 10 v. Visa as an example, we demonstrate how the
epidemiological template can be applied to resolve contributory
infringement disputes. The Section closes with a discussion of why use
of the Sufficient Component Cause framework makes particular sense
in the field of intellectual property.
1. The "But-for" Test
Factual causation is typically evaluated under one of two tests:
the "but-for" test and the "substantial factor" test. 26 9 Under the first
test, "[c]onduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have
occurred but for that conduct." 270 For example, in attempting to hold a
bank liable for a murder committed by a terrorist organization, the
plaintiff must demonstrate not only financial support from the bank to
271
the defendant, but that that support helped to produce the murder.
Without evidence of a "causal link" between the bank's financial
assistance to the terrorist group and the murder, the bank could not
272
be held liable for aiding and abetting.
273
The but-for test explains "the greater number" of tort cases,
and can even be observed in some recent contributory infringement
decisions. For example, in the Visa case, the majority explained its
holding in terms of but-for causation, stating that "because
infringement of Perfect 10's copyrights can occur without using
Defendants' payment system, we hold that payment processing by the
Defendants as alleged in Perfect 10's First Amended Complaint does

269. 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12:2 (3d ed. 2000).

270. KEETON ETAL., supranote 107, at 266.
271. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Release & Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 736 (7th Cir. 2007).

272. Id. at 736-37.
273. KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, at 266; see also Calabresi, supra note 224, at 85
(describing the "virtual universality of the but for test").
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not constitute a 'material contribution' under the test for contributory
'274
infringement of copyrights.
In other words, because, in the court's view, the event at issue
(display and reproduction of Perfect 10's copyrighted images on the
infringing websites) would still have occurred even if Visa had not
agreed to process the credit card payments of consumers patronizing
the infringing websites, Visa could not be described as the cause of the
infringement.
Although the but-for test works adequately much of the time, 2 7
there are situations where it reveals a fundamental flaw. Sometimes
the trier of fact will need to sort out the interplay of several potential
causal agents, each of which may be sufficient to produce the studied
event. In performing the necessary counterfactual analysis under the
but-for test, the trier of fact inquires only as to whether the removal of
one act will prevent the plaintiffs injury. If an event has multiple
causes, the removal of one act will still permit the event to occur and
no one act can be described as a but-for cause. This phenomenon,
commonly described as "overdetermination," is a well-known problem
276
for the but-for test.
The but-for test was viewed as unacceptable in these cases of
"overdetermined" or "duplicative 277 causation because the same event
would have occurred absent one of the acts at issue. 278 For example, in
a case where the defendant set a fire that merged with a fire from
another source and then ended up burning the plaintiffs property, the
279
defendant could argue that it did not cause the plaintiffs injury.
Because the fire from the other source would have burned the
plaintiffs property with or without the addition of the defendant's fire,
the defendant could not be deemed a but-for cause of the plaintiffs
damages.
A slightly different problem for the but-for test occurs when
many different actions come together to produce an outcome.
Sometimes an event is caused not by a single factor but by the
presence of multiple factors arriving in the right time and sequence.

274. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2007).
275. See David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third)of Torts: Three Arguable
Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1009 (2009).

276. See Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can Help
Determine Harmless Errorin Criminal Trials,99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1053, 1078 (2005).
277. DOBBS, supra note 141, at 415.
278. KEETON ETAL., supra note 107, at 266-67.
279. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 48-49
(Minn. 1920).
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In fact, causal theorists tell us that this is how most events occur. 280
Moreover, there may be multiple sets of actions, with each resulting in
the same outcome. 28 1 Note that a court's task in determining whether
the defendant caused a tortious event in the midst of several
independent causal factors is exponentially more difficult than when
only a single causal act is being examined. 282 Yet the underlying
assumption behind the but-for test is that particular acts must be
isolated and unquestionably associated with an observed event,
ignoring the presence of multifactor causation. 283 As a result, it may
often be impossible to identify the defendant's actions as a but-for
284
cause of the plaintiffs harm.
Take, for example, the case of twenty separate factory owners
who all discharge waste into a single stream. Plaintiff owns a quaint
cottage downstream from the factories. Although each factory owner's
individual contribution is minimal, when several discharges (but not
necessarily all twenty of the discharges) are totaled together, the
result is a fouling of the waters that works an injury on the
plaintiff. 28 5 An individual factory's minimal discharge cannot be
described as the but-for cause of the injury; even if one factory had
disposed of its waste properly, the discharge by the nineteen others
still would have injured the plaintiff. The problem is that a causation
rule that excludes situations where a court cannot pinpoint whether a
contributory defendant's conduct is a but-for cause of plaintiffs harm
seems too stingy. 286 We may intuitively believe that liability should be
found even in situations where the conduct at issue is not a but-for
cause of harm. 287

280. See KENNETH J. ROTHMAN ET AL., MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 5-7 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing
"sufficient-cause" model).
281. See id.
282. Cf. Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness, Participation,
and the Frontiersof Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 503 (1993) (describing how, as societies
became more industrial, they became more complex, resulting in interactions through many
intermediaries and "social structures in which causal connections became indirect and often
unforeseeable").
283. Conway-Jones, supra note 170, at 886-87.
284. See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 811, 833-34 (2009) (discussing intersection of multiple causal factors and "impracticality
of attempting to identify a single factual or legal cause" of harm).
285. This example is borrowed from Warren v. Parkhurst, 92 N.Y.S. 725, 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1904).
286. See Fisch, supra note 284, at 834 ("[Elven when the presence of multiple causal factors
makes it impossible to identify the defendant's tortuous conduct as a but-for cause of the
plaintiffs harm, common law courts have nonetheless imposed liability.").
287. Honor6, supra note 226 (discussing "cases in which the but-for test is difficult to
reconcile with our intuitive judgments of responsibility").
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These issues of overdetermination and multifactor causation
haunt use of the but-for test in contributory infringement litigation.
For example, suppose various entities do things that facilitate the
maintenance of a website that displays user-generated content.
Sometimes the website's users post infringing material. A search
engine allows consumers to find the website. 288 An advertiser pays the
website owner to place its ads on the website, thereby providing
needed funds for the maintenance of the website. 28 9 A credit card
company allows the website to receive payments for access to its
content. 290 Another entity encourages consumers to use the website to
display and reproduce copyrighted content. 291 How should the
contributions of these entities be assessed? When we engage in the
counterfactual analysis required of the but-for test, it is hard to argue
that any of these entities are but-for causes of infringement. Illegal
posting might still take place even if the advertising, credit card
processing, or search engine listings were discontinued. Likewise, it
may be impossible to prove that users would not have posted
infringing content but for the encouragement they received from a
separate entity. 292 Yet courts have decided that at least some of these
actions constitute material contributions to infringement.
2. The "Substantial Factor" Test
A second test of causation, the "substantial factor" test, was
introduced to assess those situations where two acts simultaneously
(or nearly simultaneously) bring about an event, yet either act,
293
operating alone, could have produced the event independently.
Under the substantial factor test, if any one act, operating alone,
would be sufficient to bring about the event, then each actor is
288. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155-58 (9th Cir. 2007).
289. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 926 (2005)
(defendant sold advertising space rather than charging a user fee); see also Casey C. Charles,
Comment, Landlords, Dance Halls, and UGC Hosts: Direct Financial Benefit and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1085, 1109 (2009) ("An important caveat is
that the absence of a paying subscriber does not act as a liability shield where the advertiser has
treated an infringing host's website as a draw.").
290. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 793, 808 (9th Cir. 2007).
291. Cf. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that "liability exists if the defendant engages in personal conduct that encourages or
assists the infringement").
292. Honor6, supra note 226 (explaining how encouragement can be a good example of
overdetermination as a person may receive encouragement from multiple sources in the context
of interpersonal relationships yet we cannot show that the person would have acted differently if
one source of encouragement is removed).
293. KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, at 266-67.
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independently responsible. 294 Hence, the person who starts one of two
fires that burn down the same area factually caused the plaintiffs
injury because his action was sufficient, by itself, to cause the injury.
The substantial factor test also has been used by courts to find factual
causation when the presence of multiple competing factors makes the
precise causal role of a single factor impossible to define. 2 95 In the
factory example above, if a court concludes that one factory's discharge
"substantially" contributed to the ruining of the plaintiffs riverfront,
the test is satisfied even if the injury still would have occurred without
the single factory's contribution. 296 Words of encouragement may be
deemed "substantial" for their contribution to the direct tortfeasor's
decision to do wrong even if the direct tortfeasor received sufficient
297
encouragement from other sources as well.
Although the substantial factor test allows for liability in the
face of overdetermination, the problem with the substantial factor test
is that it offers very little guidance to the trier of fact. 298 According to
common law tort doctrine, for something to be a substantial factor, it
must actually facilitate the underlying tort in a meaningful way and
not just represent "a little aid."299 The case law suggests that the
contribution cannot be "too small," but offers little prescriptive advice
on how to differentiate contributions that are insignificant from ones
that are substantial. 30 0 The difficulty for intellectual property courts
in applying the substantial factor test lies in determining when the
quantity of infringement facilitated by the contributory defendant's
services is too great. It is not obvious that a single factory's minimal
discharge should be considered a substantial factor in the riverfront

294. Id.
295. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973)
(finding sufficient connection between the separate but cumulative effects from multiple
defendants in context of asbestos exposure); see also Fisch, supra note 284, at 835 (noting classic
and modern examples of multicausal factor analysis).
296. Courts openly acknowledge that the substantial factor test is less rigorous and more
plaintiff-friendly than the but-for test. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 561
n. 17 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that "a 'but for' test requires more direct linkage between defendant's
conduct and the injury than does the 'substantial factor' [test]").
297. Honor6, supra note 226.
298. DOBBS, supra note 141, at 416 ('CThe substantial factor test is not so much a test as an
incantation."); Honor6, supra note 226 (noting that the substantial factor approach to causation
"presupposes an independent understanding of causes as necessary and/or sufficient conditions
in relation to their consequences").
299. See In re Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1434-35
(D. Ariz. 1992) ("Substantial assistance means more than a little aid.") (quoting Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986)).
300. See Lorrain v. Ryan, 628 A.2d 543, 547-48 (Vt. 1993) (discussing damages and
difficulties with apportionment).
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property owner's injury. Similarly, how should a court decide whether
the provision of credit card payment services, internet access, online
location services, advertising revenue, or words of encouragement is
"substantial" enough? Picking up on this ambiguity, many tort law
scholars criticize the substantial factor test for replacing the rigor of
the but-for test with a regime that offers no guidance to juries
determining causation.30 1 The ambiguity within the substantial factor
test threatens to collapse the distinction between factual and
proximate causation as the trier of fact is given full discretion to
decide what makes an action substantial or not. 30 2 If the substantial
factor test lacks sufficient content to be useful and the but-for test
exempts too many actions from liability, we need to find another
model for assessing causation.
3. The Sufficient Component Cause Framework
Luckily,
epidemiology
has
recognized
causation's
interdependent nature for a while and has developed its causal
methodology accordingly. The epidemiologist Kenneth Rothman
suggested in 1976 that causation can best be thought of via the
concept of a sufficient causal mechanism. 30 3 Rothman defines a
sufficient causal mechanism as a constellation of events or
30 4
characteristics that is minimally sufficient for an outcome to occur.
Rothman considered causes as necessary components in a sufficient
causal mechanism and thus his interpretation became known as the
Sufficient Component Cause ("SCC") framework. Rothman's causal
framework asks if there is a group of events, characteristics, or
conditions that, acting together, is sufficient to result in some
outcome. His analysis deals with a major weakness of the but-for
causation standard-the failure to recognize the interdependent
nature of the various factors resulting in some event. Rothman's
301. E.g., Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Jr., Unraveling Causation:Back to the Basics, 3
U. BALT. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 4 (1993) (suggesting such an approach "essentially boils down to telling
the jury just to use common sense"); Robertson, supra note 138, at 1780 (noting that use of
"substantial factor" in the context of legal causation is "not conducive to clarity"); Richard W.
Wright, Causationin Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1782-83 (1985) (discussing evolution of the
substantial factor test). Most distressing to these scholars, modem courts employ the substantial
factor test in situations that do not involve two distinct acts that jointly bring about an event.
See, e.g., Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (applying in context of
"chronic exposure to toxic chemicals"); see also David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 94 KY. L.J.
277, 277 (2006) ("Over the years, courts also used the substantial factor test to do an increasing
variety of things it was never intended to do and for which it is not appropriate.").
302. Wright, supra note 301, at 1781-84.
303. Kenneth J. Rothman, Causes, 104 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 587, 587 (1976).
304. ROTHMAN ET AL., supranote 280, at 6.
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framework contributes the insight that entire causal mechanisms,
rather than isolated actions, should be scrutinized. Instead of simply
looking at one piece of a complete causal pie, the epidemiologist
constructs several complete causal mechanisms and examines
multiple pieces at once. This sort of analysis of causation reveals that
an action may be causal even when its removal still permits the
studied event to occur, given the presence of a complete, independent
causal mechanism. 3 5 Spread of the H1N1 virus may occur in hospitals
even though health care workers are washing their hands because the
disease is also being transmitted through workers coughing and
sneezing and the behaviors of infected patients.
The SCC framework's ability to address multifactor causation
can be best demonstrated through graphical representations. 30 6 For
example, assume our interest is in the prevention of mortality from
automobile accidents. A sufficient component cause diagram may be
represented as:

Causal Mechanism 1

single
"
*
*

Causal Mechanism 2

Causal mechanism 1 represents a fatality resulting from a
car accident. Each of the components is defined as follows:
Component A represents excessive speed of the driver.
Component B represents the lack of use of a seat belt.
Component C represents a slick road surface due to rain.

305. See John McBeth & Lis Cordingley, Current Issues and New Direction in Psychology
and Health: Epidemiology and Health Psychology-Please Bridge the Gap, 24 PSYCH. & HEALTH
861, 863 (2009).
306. See Rothman, supra note 303, at 589 (depicting sufficient cause components).
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Component D represents inadequate signage at a sharp turn in
the road.
Component E represents a faulty guardrail.

Now observe causal mechanism 2. This mechanism again
results in the outcome under study, a fatality from an automobile
accident. The individual causal components are defined as follows:
* Component A represents excessive speed of the driver.
* Component B represents failure to use a seat belt.
* Component F represents the distraction of the driver by a cell
phone call.
* Component G represents a malfunctioning traffic signal.
* Component H represents the presence of a second car.
Note that for the same outcome-in this case, mortality from
car accidents-there is more than one sufficient causal mechanism.
This makes intuitive sense as there is certainly more than one way for
a car accident to take place. Further, the two causal mechanisms
share some component causes (that is, A and B) and have others that
are unique unto themselves. An important point in Rothman's
definition of a sufficient causal mechanism is that in the presence of
all of the components of either causal mechanism, the outcome will
take place. 30 7 In other words, each pie chart represents a set of
conditions sufficient to cause a death from a car accident.
The SCC framework is more inclusive than the but-for
causation test. One can see that even for a single car accident,
multiple different component causes enter into the equation. So long
as a particular component can be deemed a necessary part of a single
causal mechanism, it can be labeled a "cause" of the event being
studied, even if it is not necessary to another causal mechanism for
the same event. For example, someone applying but-for causation to
components D and E might argue that the sign-maker and the
guardrail manufacturer should be absolved from responsibility
because, even if we imagined a counterfactual world without their
negligent behavior, car accidents would still occur, as evidenced by the
graph of causal mechanism 2. According to the SCC framework,
however, the determination of a cause of an event does not imply its
presence in every sufficient causal mechanism. An action or condition
that causes one instance of an event may be completely unrelated to
another instance of the same type of event.30 8 Intuitively we
understand that every automobile accident does not involve a faulty
307. ROTHMAN ETAL., supranote 280, at 6.
308. Id. at 6-7.
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guardrail. The SCC framework formalizes this intuition and reveals
that the relevance of a causal event cannot be studied in isolation;
rather, an independent combination of particular factors can produce
3°9
the studied event.
4. Applying the SCC Framework to Contributory Infringement
Courts could use a similar analysis to identify when a
contribution is "material" to some act of infringement. For a few
reasons, we believe that courts evaluating contributory infringement
should use a model permitting causal findings when an act is part of a
single sufficient causal mechanism. First, at least in some specific
subject areas, tort law is moving towards imposing liability in
situations of overdetermined and multifactor causation. 310 It may be
time to employ a similar sensitivity to the presence of multiple causal
factors in the contributory infringement context. Second, intellectual
property transactions often implicate multiple actors. Unlike some
tortious acts injuring one's personal property or person that involve
relatively simple interfaces between one actor and one victim,
intellectual property violations often involve multiple parties at
once. 311 Digital technology compounds this phenomenon as millions of
users may transact with a particular website and with a particular

309. See Conway-Jones, supra note 170, at 887 (criticizing use of the but-for and substantial
factor causation tests in toxic tort litigation because both "are predicated on the assumption that
events can be isolated, identified, and unquestionably associated with an expected event").
310. In the mid-1980s, Richard Wright developed a new analysis of causation. Under his
paradigm, which he labeled the NESS test, the trier of fact must determine whether the
defendant's act is a necessary element for the sufficiency of a sufficient set. Wright, supra note
301, at 1788. Wright's test has gained increasing support in the legal academy over the past
twenty-five years. See Fischer, supra note 301, at 277 ("[S]everal prestigious scholars now
advocate some version of the NESS test .... "); Richard Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation and
the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency, and Causal Sufficiency, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
83, 83 (2001) ("[The NESS test] has been the most successful and influential work in this area in
recent years."). Like the SCC model, the NESS test relies on the understanding that there might
be a variety of distinct sets of conditions that are sufficient to produce a particular event. Wright,
supra note 207, at 1102. Wright states the causal rule of NESS as follows: "[A] condition
contributed to some consequence if and only if it was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of
existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence." Id. at
1102-03. Following this rule, a court should examine not whether an individual factory's
discharge was independently sufficient to ruin the plaintiffs waterfront, but whether the
individual factory's discharge was necessary to a set of antecedent conditions that added up to
the plaintiffs injury. Id. at 1106-07. Thus, NESS permits a court to find causation even in
circumstances where the defendant's contribution would have failed the but-for test.
311. See Bartholomew, supra note 29, at 822 ("Transactions between contributors and direct
infringers are often conducted ...through multiple intermediaries.").
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item of intellectual property at the same time. 3 12 Given all these
moving parts, it makes sense to employ a model for contributory
infringement that acknowledges the presence of multifactor causation.
Finally, such a model represents a greater emphasis on prediction
than attribution. The SCC framework asks the trier of fact to concoct
a series of recipes for when a particular event will occur. In contrast,
the but-for test narrowly focuses on the question of whether the entity
at issue changed the course of past events. 3 13 Because intellectual
property law is designed to foster innovation, 31 4 courts must balance
the goal of assigning responsibility with the goal of predicting which
liability rules can best preserve the incentives for intellectual
creation. 31 5 A theory of multiple component causes strikes this balance
31 6
better than tort law's traditional test of causation.
Here is how the SCC framework might work in the
contributory infringement context. The diagram below describes the
scenario at issue in Visa-an unauthorized website provides access to
copies of the plaintiff's copyrighted works and accepts payment in the
form of credit card transfers:

312. See Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[S]ix million
new listings are posted on eBay daily."); Jeffrey Rosen, Google's Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Nov. 30, 2008, at 50 ("Google estimates that something like 13 hours of content are uploaded
every minute.").
313. Honor6, supra note 226.
314. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
315. This is not the same balance struck by traditional tort liability rules, which often turn
on whether the defendant deviated from a customary standard, which can disincentivize
innovation. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1784, 1813 (2009) ('To the extent that the normative force of custom affects the
outcomes of negligence cases, there is the risk that the custom rule creates a disincentive to
innovation.'); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285,
290-98 (2008) (discussing the role of compliance with custom in determining liability for
negligence); see also George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537, 538 (1972) (contending that tort law is structured so that issues of certain individual rights
trump utilitarian concerns).
316. When compared to the but-for causation test, both the substantial factor test and the
SCC model expand the number of actions that can be identified as causal. SCC is a better
solution, however, as it retains the counterfactual analysis of the but-for test, but requires this
analysis to be performed in the proper context, i.e., in the presence of other component causes.
See infra Part III.C.
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Causal Mechanism I

Causal Mechanism 2

Causal mechanisms 1 and 2 describe events of online copyright
infringement. Each of the components is defined as follows:
* Component A represents the presence of a valid copyrighted
photograph. This component reflects satisfaction of the
originality, fixation, and authorship requirements of copyright
law.
* Component B represents the ability of an individual to find the
copyrighted material on the internet.
* Component C refers to the ability of the consumer to access the
infringing material online through the connectivity provided by
an internet service provider.
* Component D represents the hosting of the copyrighted
material on the direct infringer's website.
* Component E represents the ability to access the infringing
website via a paid credit card subscription.
* Component F represents financial support for the direct
infringer's website in the form of paid advertising.
Just as with the automobile fatality example, one can see that,
even for a single case of online copyright infringement, multiple
different component causes enter into the equation, implicating
several parties. Component B may be the responsibility of a search
engine, such as Google. Component C is the responsibility of internet
service providers like cable and telephone service companies.
Component D is the responsibility of the direct infringer, which makes
the infringing images available over the internet for a fee. Component
E is the responsibility of credit card companies like Visa that process
the payments that allow consumers to access the infringing site.
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The diagram shows that online infringement can take more
than one form, and that a party's actions may still be causal even if
their removal does not put an end to all infringement. It may be that
multiple search engines (for example, Google, Yahoo, Bing) allow
individuals to find the infringing websites. According to the SCC
model, this overdetermination does not invalidate causation because
the presence of one search engine as part of one causal mechanism
potentially identifies it as a cause. This is to say that more than one
party may potentially supply a component in the causal mechanism,
and the presence of alternative suppliers of the causal component
should not invalidate causal responsibility.
The diagram also addresses multifactor causation. Even when
the ability to receive credit card payments is taken away (Component
E), infringement may continue to occur if the rogue website raises
sufficient advertising revenue (Component F). This scenario presented
great difficulty for the Ninth Circuit in determining whether or not
Visa was causally responsible for the activity of the infringing
websites. The diagram above is only descriptive of one interpretation
of events; it does not prove that Visa caused the infringement. But it
does demonstrate that Visa's responsibility turns, at least in part, on
the particular causation model being employed. The majority found
that Visa could not be liable because infringement "can occur without
using Defendants' payment system." 3 17 The majority's interpretation is
reasonable if one strictly applies the but-for test for factual causation.
On the other hand, the SCC model allows for factual causation to be
found even if infringement still occurs when the provision of credit
card services is assumed away.
One potential criticism of this approach is that it makes factual
causation easier to satisfy, thereby broadening the material
contribution requirement and potentially opening up more
technologists to liability. We do not disagree. A factual causation
standard that takes into account multiple component causes is easier
to meet than the but-for standard. If courts become concerned that too
many businesses are being subjected to third-party liability under the
new analysis of factual causation, they will need to focus more on
either the knowledge prong of contributory infringement or on an
evaluation of proximate cause. Either of these approaches would be
superior to the opaque and inconsistent way these cases are currently
adjudicated. Courts routinely address questions of scienter in other
contexts and, hence, placing a greater emphasis on the contributory
defendant's mental state would not pose an inappropriate burden for
317. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2007).
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judges and juries. And while the policy concerns embedded in
proximate cause are often viewed as an area for legislative, not
judicial expertise, it is by no means clear that Congress is always the
superior factfinder in this regard. 318 Moreover, in the field of
intellectual property, where the impact of new technologies inevitably
takes a central role in much judicial analysis, it seems better to
address proximate cause issues directly instead of hiding behind the
language of factual causation.
B. Awareness of the Difference Between Generaland
Specific Causation
Ten years ago, a movie starring Julia Roberts got people
talking about chromium. The movie Erin Brockovich dramatized the
events surrounding a class action lawsuit involving exposure to a
319
particular form of chromium, hexavalent chromium or Cr(VI).
Members of a California community sued local utility Pacific Gas and
Electric ("PG&E"), contending that its use of Cr(VI) contaminated
their groundwater and caused cancer in residents. As proof of Cr(VI)'s
deleterious effects, the community pointed to diagnoses of cancer in
specific individuals in the community. 320 The lawsuit resulted in a
3 21
record-breaking settlement.
Years later, a group of epidemiologists investigated the link
between Cr(VI) and cancer. They assessed cancer rates among the
general California population as well as PG&E employees, both
companywide and at three sites that utilized Cr(VI) in their cooling
towers. 322 They found that workers at PG&E had lower cancer rates
than the general population and that the rates of cancer and related
mortality were not different between workers at the selected sites and
323
other PG&E workers around the state.

318. See Caitlinn E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding,
84 IND. L.J. 1, 40-46 (2009) (offering several criticisms of the conventional wisdom surrounding
legislative factfinding).
319. ERIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios, Columbia Pictures 2000).
320. See Gina Kolata, A Hit Movie Is Rated 'F' in Science, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2000, at D7
("As Ms. Brockovich in the movie gathered medical histories from more than 600 Hinkley
residents, she never seemed to doubt that every ailment was caused by chromium(VI).").
321. Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute
Employment ArbitrationAgreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 325 n.26 (2003).
322. William J. Blot et al., A Cohort Mortality Study Among Gas Generator Utility Workers,
42 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 194, 194-95 (2000).

323. The lower rates of cancer among PG&E employees were attributed to the "healthy
worker effect." That is healthy individuals tend to be employed while those stricken with cancer
are often not healthy enough to acquire physically demanding jobs. Id. at 197.
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Why the discrepancy? The case of Cr(VI) highlights an
important nuance to causation: causal analysis is often used to answer
two different types of questions. 324 At times, we use "causation" to
reference an inquiry into the effect of an action on an outcome. At
other times, "causation" refers to an investigation into the cause of a
particular instance of an event.325 One of these causal questions is
general, the other is specific. Does Cr(VI) cause cancer? Did Cr(VI)
cause my cancer? When determining factual causation, it is important
326
to be precise as to which type of causal inquiry we are undertaking.
Unfortunately, the courts adjudicating contributory infringement
disputes have been especially imprecise on this issue. In this Section,
we describe how courts have analyzed the material contribution
requirement under both general and specific causation without
acknowledging the difference. We then explain why investigating
general causation is preferable, at least in the specialized context of
contributory infringement.
1. Inconsistent Use of General and Specific Causation in
Contributory Infringement Decisions
As demonstrated in the previous Section, the Visa court
invoked the classic definition of but-for causation. In order to identify
the shortcomings of this test, we can rewrite it more precisely as:
X is a cause of Y if and only if
Y(x=l) =

1 and Y(x=o) = 0

Generally the characters I and 0 can be read as present and
absent respectively. Therefore, the notation Y(x=l) = 1 can be read as Y
is present when X is present. Note that we can never directly observe
both Y(x=l) and Y(x=o) at the same time. At the most, one can be
observed directly and the other must be empirically estimated or
327
based upon one's intuition.

324. See Christopher Hitchcock, Probabilistic Causation, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archivesfall200S/entries/
causation-probabilistic/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (distinguishing singular causal claims from
general causal claims).
325. A.P. Dawid, CausalInference Without Counterfactuals, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 407, 408
(2000).
326. See id. at 423 ("Mf one wants to make meaningful and useful assertions about the
causes of effects, then one must be very clear about the meaning and context of one's queries.").
327. See Michael D. Green, The Future of Proportional Liability: The Lessons of Toxic
Substances Causation, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 352, 354 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005)
(discussing the "uncertainty" and the "probabilistic nature of factual assessments such as
causation").
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Without explicitly stating that they are doing so, some courts
have used a different causal test to evaluate the material contribution
requirement. For example, in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, the Ninth
Circuit explained that it had "little difficulty" in holding that the
plaintiffs' allegations satisfied the material contribution requirement
for a swap meet owner accused of contributing to the infringing
activities of its vendors. 328 Relying on factual causation, at least in
part, to make this determination, the court explained: "[1]t would be
difficult for the infringing activity to take place in the massive
quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap
meet." 329 Under this brand of counterfactual analysis, when the
removal of the defendant's actions reduces the aggregate amount of
injury suffered by the plaintiff, causation has been satisfied. We can
represent the causal test used in Fonovisa as follows:
X is a cause of Y if and only if
Y(X=I) = Y1 and Y(x=o) = Yo
for any Y1 0 Yo
The definition above demonstrates that the Fonovisa court did
not use the same test of causality as the Visa court. It used a test of
general causation while the Visa court used a test of specific causation.
The key distinction between the but-for test used in Visa and the test
used in Fonovisa is the expected outcome in the absence of the
defendant's actions, defined as Yo in the formal definition. In the Visa
decision, the court required that Yo = 0, effectively that there is no
infringement in the absence of the defendant's actions. Hence, under
the Visa court's analysis, any infringement occurring in the absence of
the defendant's activity defeats causation. 330 For the Fonovisa court,
however, there is not an expectation that putting a stop to a
contributory defendant's causative activities should end all
infringement. 331 In essence, the decision recognizes that the primary
infringers may continue to commit acts of infringement without the
support of the swap meet. Yet the swap meet causes at least some
infringement if the quantity of infringement with the swap meet's
services, Y 1, is greater than the quantity of infringement without, Yo.
Obviously, there is a great difference between the two
causation tests. Another way to put it is that both tests rely on
counterfactual analysis, but the content of that analysis differs. The
328. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).

329. Id.
330. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2007).
331. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (stating only that "it would be difficult for the infringing
activity to take place" without the swap meet's support services).
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Visa definition of causation requires proof that the removal of the
contributory defendant's contribution will prevent an individual,
specific case of infringement, while Fonovisa's definition of causation
only requires proof that the removal will generally stop a certain
amount of infringement. Overall, the more generalized definition of
causation appears to be favored over the specific definition by courts
evaluating recent infringement cases, 332 but it is unlikely that the
courts are consciously applying one definition over another.
2. Intellectual Property's Need for a Generalized
Causation Inquiry
We believe that in the unique context of intellectual property,
it makes sense to formalize use of a generalized inquiry into factual
causation, like the test used in Fonovisa. There is a lot riding on
whether a court chooses the more specific or the more general view of
causation; one view is much more generous to plaintiffs than the
other. But our concern is not so much the level of generosity afforded
to plaintiffs as the need to select a causation definition that tracks the
goals behind intellectual property protection.
Intellectual property law differs from general tort law in that it
is particularly concerned with the aggregate effects of a defendant's
behavior rather than precisely identifying who is blameworthy for a
particular wrongful act. Starting from its explicit link to "Progress" in
the arts and sciences in the U.S. Constitution, 333 intellectual property
law derives legitimacy from its instrumental effectiveness, not in how
it satisfies any particular moral code. 334 Hence, the rationale for
patent and copyright laws is their ability to incentivize the creation of
new creative works and inventions. 335 Similarly, the most familiar
justification for trademark law focuses on preserving efficient
marketplaces. 336 As a result, the goal of contributory infringement law
332. E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007); In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003); Lifetime Homes, Inc. v. Residential
Dev. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 2d 794, 806-07 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
333. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
334. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 7 (2d ed.
2006) ("[Clopyright's purpose is purely utilitarian."); see also Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, SelfRealizing Inventions and the UtilitarianFoundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897,
901 (2009) ("Almost all commentators and judges agree that.., the purpose of the patent system
").
is to induce the creation and commercialization of technology ....

335. See David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652,
684 (2010) ("The idea of private ownership of information as an incentive to create is obviously
integral to patent and copyright law.').
336. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623-24

(2004); see also Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA
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lies mostly in furthering these instrumental purposes. Contributory
infringement doctrine tries to identify parties that are fanning the
flames of infringement and stop their conduct before there is a
337
precipitous decline in the incentives for intellectual creation.
338
Contributory infringement cases often involve new technologies,
and intellectual property law, given its instrumental goals, strives to
339
serve as an incubator for these commercial innovations.
The general approach to factual causation acts instrumentally
by asking what the effects of a particular causal agent are. For
example, a court weighing the materiality of a new technological
service to infringement engages in some sort of analysis of the effects
of that service on the general amount of infringement occurring in the
marketplace. It is not so important to the court to pinpoint whether
the service facilitated a particular act of infringement (for example, a
single illegal download of the latest Lady Gaga track from a peer-topeer file sharing system). Rather, the real question is just how many
acts of infringement can be attributed to the activities of the
contributory defendant. The point of the analysis is not so much to tie
blameworthy actors to specific wrongful acts as it is to impose liability
where it can have a significant impact in stanching the flow of
340
infringing activity.

L. REV. 63, 117 (2009) (discussing the ways in which producer and consumer interests should
influence trademark law).
337. See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 521, 522 (1953) (explaining that patent law's statutory provision against
contributory infringement was designed to preserve incentives for inventors).
338. See Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1835-36 (2009) (asserting that the development of new technologies
raises "difficult questions about the relationship between the new technology and copyright
law"); Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of Intellectual
Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 855, 879-80 (2007) (explaining the difficulty intellectual
property law sometimes has in responding to new technologies).
339. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 13 (5th ed. 2010) ("[G]overnment has created intellectual property rights in an effort to give
authors and inventors control over the use and distribution of their ideas, thereby encouraging
them to invest in the production of new ideas and works of authorship."); Barton Beebe,
Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 813 (2010) ("[T]he
express purpose and primary effect of intellectual property law remains . . . the promotion of
technological and cultural progress.").
340. This focus on the instrumental effects of contributory infringement verdicts is evident
in the general predisposition of courts to favor injunctive relief over damages awards in
infringement actions. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (suggesting that injunctions will remain the standard remedy in patent cases);
Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property
Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 568 n.105 (2008) ("In the intellectual property context,
injunctive relief is generally the available and appropriate remedy, but the state of the law in
this area remains controversial.'.
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By contrast, a specific approach to factual causation examines
events and tries to find their cause so as to impose liability on culpable
parties. By emphasizing the importance of linking the actor to a
particular single event, the specific approach to causation steers more
towards concepts of blame and fairness and less towards instrumental
purposes. Precisely identifying blameworthy parties is an important
aspect of tort law. 34 1 Yet blameworthiness is not as central to the
principles of intellectual property law. 342 The generalized approach,
finding causation in situations that are likely to have important
aggregate effects on the total amount of infringement, hews more
343
closely to these principles.
Admittedly, contributory infringement law, like tort law,
strikes a balance between concepts of corrective justice and
distributive justice. 344 Although we advocate a general causation
analysis designed to position liability where it can do the most for
aggregate social welfare, we also note that our plan for contributory
infringement still requires proof of some knowledge of the underlying
infringing activity, a requirement that owes more to individual rights
than community interests. 345 Proximate cause also continues to exist
in our plan, preventing those extensions of liability that may enhance
overall social welfare, but stray too far from public sentiments
regarding fairness and blame. However, the balance between the
normative components of liability-a culpable mental state and
proximate cause-and causation should be struck more in favor of

341. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67
IND. L.J. 349, 351 (1992) (emphasizing the centrality of fault in tort law).
342. See Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfimder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
("Copyright and trademark law are not matters of strong moral principle."), vacated and
remanded, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
343. One might argue that by advocating a general rather than specific approach to
causation, we are really asking courts to impose liability on the basis of risk instead of actual
harm. In a sense, however, all analyses of causality are based on probabilities. Even in
determining whether one particular act caused one particular event, "nature's laws are
deterministic and randomness surfaces owing merely to our ignorance of the underlying
boundary conditions." PEARL, supra note 231, at 26. Hence, risk is an essential aspect of any
causal analysis, general or specific. Moreover, even if courts did implement our causation model
in their analysis of material contribution, liability would also require an actual violation of the
plaintiffs intellectual property rights, as no claim for contributory infringement is permitted
without proof of an underlying act of direct infringement. Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear
Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
344. For an insightful discussion of how, in general, the law should balance these competing
approaches, see generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
(2002).
345. The inducement variety of contributory infringement, as enunciated in the Grokster
decision, puts particular emphasis on proof of a culpable mental state and just punishment for
individuals. See Bartholomew, supra note 29, at 840-44.
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distributive justice in the particular context of intellectual property,
and that is why a causation model addressing general causation is
appropriate. Moreover, regardless of whether a specific or general
approach to causation is favored, the imprecise way that factual
causation has been defined in infringement law has led to a great deal
of confusion. Some of this confusion could be allayed by openly stating
which type of counterfactual analysis is being employed-that is, what
the required value of Yo must be to demonstrate causation.
C. DeterminingAccurate Referents
Another critical part of the epidemiologist's causal framework
is specifying a referent for each component identified in a causal
mechanism. 346 Knowing the disease rate in a particular subpopulation
exposed to some contaminant can provide no causal knowledge
without an estimate of the expected rate absent the exposure.
Epidemiological scholarship explicitly acknowledges the role of the
counterfactual in determining not only each component of the causal
mechanism, but also its appropriate referent, suggesting that an
action, event, or condition can only be determined as a cause with
respect to some specified alternative. 347 Although the concept seems
simple, oftentimes much care must be dedicated to assigning a proper
referent. In this Section, we describe the importance of referent
selection to epidemiological research. Epidemiologists must test the
logic of particular referent choices and identify them with
specificity. 348 We then discuss how courts could incorporate rigorous
referent selection into the material contribution analysis.
1. Referent Selection in Epidemiology
Whenever a researcher suggests a potential component of a
causal mechanism, the real causal impact of that component is tested
by the determination of a suitable referent. 349 The process of referent

346. ROTHMAN ET AL., supranote 280, at 7.
347. Id. at 7-8.
348. What we refer to here as a "referent," philosopher David Lewis characterized as
possibilities "at some accessible world." DAVID K. LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS 5 (1973). Lewis
described a process whereby a universe of possible worlds must be identified in order to ascertain
the truth value of counterfactual statements. See id. Since our concern here is identifying the
causal role of a particular action or event, we use the term "referent" to describe specific
alternative actions in a counterfactual world.
349. What we term here a "suitable referent" others have referred to as "the manipulations
(interventions) that will transport us from the actual to a counterfactual possible world .
Scheines, supranote 35, at 964.
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specification requires the researcher to examine whether her
assumptions about the force of a particular component are reasonable.
Specifying potential referents may reveal that what the researcher
believed to be a significant causal force really has no effect on the
outcome at issue. Take the case of the effects of advanced paternal age
on the success rate of assisted reproductive technologies ("ART"').
Until recently, it was believed that increased paternal age led to lower
ART success rates. This belief was based in part on evidence from a
study of couples implanted with female egg cells from anonymous
young donors. 35 0 The study revealed that there were significant
increases in pregnancy loss, decreases in live birth rate, and decreases
35 1
in early embryo formation for men greater than fifty years of age.
Yet new research shows that paternal age does not have such a
striking effect on pregnancy. 352 Instead, the earlier study was flawed
by use of an improper referent. That study compared couples featuring
older men with couples featuring younger men. It did not acknowledge
the role that the maternal recipient's age could play in this process.
Those couples attempting multiple cycles of ART typically featured
older maternal recipients and had lower success rates. When
researchers compared paternal ages using only a couple's first attempt
353
at ART, there was little evidence for a causal effect.
In addition to requiring testing of potential referent choices,
epidemiology mandates that the alternative to a potential causal
component be identified with specificity. 354 Requiring the precise
acknowledgement of a referent for any particular causal analysis is
crucial in identifying the causal contribution. For example, most
would acknowledge that drinking alcohol during pregnancy causes
health related problems in offspring. Yet as a causal statement, this is
far too imprecise. There are many examples of women drinking prior
to knowledge of a pregnancy or in limited amounts without ill effects
on the child. Without properly specifying the referent, anecdotal
evidence such as this can be used to weaken causal claims. Instead,
the analyst must identify the amount and timing of alcohol
consumption during pregnancy as well as the fetus's developmental

350. John L. Frattarelli et al., Male Age Negatively Impacts Embryo Development and
Reproductive Outcome in Donor Oocyte Assisted Reproductive Technology Cycles, 90 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 97, 97-103 (2008).
351. Id. at 102.
352. Brian W. Whitcomb et al., Contribution of Male Age to Outcomes in Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 147, 148-50 (2011).
353. Id. at 148-49.
354. ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 280, at 7-8.
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state upon exposure. 355 Requiring specification of a referent forces the
trier of fact to precisely identify an actor's causal contribution.
2. Applying Referent Selection Practices to
Contributory Infringement
To the extent courts consider referents, they often remain in
the background as unstated assumptions.3 5 6 But in retraining our
minds to analyze causation more openly and accurately, identifying
referents is essential. We offer a formal definition of causation for
contributory infringement, integrating the importance of referent
selection into prior definitions as follows:
X1 is a cause of Y with respect to some alternative X2
if and only if
Y(x=xl) = Y1 and Y(x=x2) = Yo
for any Y1 # Yo
Writing our test in prose, we would say that some event, action,
or condition is a cause of some outcome with respect to some specified
alternative if, and only if, the expected outcome when the action is
present is different than when the alternative is present. This is the
definition that we propose courts employ when assessing the
materiality of a defendant's contribution to infringement.
The new definition requires the trier of fact to provide some
explanation for the alternative, X2, to the proposed causal agent, X1 .
The presence or absence of causation hinges on this comparison. For
example, one trier of fact may contend that the reasonable alternative

355. See Asher Ornoy & Zivanit Ergaz, Alcohol Abuse in Pregnant Women: Effects on the
Fetus and Newborn, Mode of Action and Maternal Treatment, 7 INT'L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB.
HEALTH 364, 367 (2010) (finding that effects of alcohol consumption during pregnancy depend on
the amount of alcohol ingested, the duration of the period of alcohol use, and the stage of fetal
development at exposure and noting that "the incidence of fetal malformations in moderately
alcohol abusing women during pregnancy did not show an increase in the rate of congenital
anomalies.")
356. The NESS model developed by Richard Wright employs many of the causal concepts
described in Part III. See generally Wright, supra note 301. We focus on the epidemiological
framework articulated by Rothman for two reasons. First, Rothman's model predates Wright's by
ten years. Second, Rothman's particular emphasis on specification of a proper referent is crucial
in applying a theory of multiple component causes to the practices of contributory infringement
law. It will never be possible to interrogate referents with the same vigor in law as in
epidemiology. The need to resolve legal disputes in a finite timeframe means that judges cannot
hold themselves to the same standards of evidentiary proof as scientists. See Andrew R. Klein,
Causation and Uncertainty: Making Connections in a Time of Change, 49 JURIMETRICS 5, 29
(2008) (discussing the difference in the legal and scientific standards for causation). But the
recent contributory infringement cases show a need for greater attention to referent selection
and Rothman's model does the best job of stressing this aspect of counterfactual analysis.
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to credit card processing services for websites that display infringing
35 7
content is sending personal checks and money orders to the website.
Under this view, X2 is funding the infringing website through personal
checks and X1 is the current regime allowing credit card payments.
Because the level of infringement is likely to drop significantly when
consumers are forced to delay gratification and wait for a check to
travel through the mail before they can access the infringing photos,
the credit card payments are a cause of infringement.
But what if the trier of fact chooses a different referent? One
could also argue that the reasonable referent in this situation is free
access to the infringing website. After all, there are many
noncommercial websites displaying infringing images and many
commercial websites rely on advertising, not user subscriptions, for
financing. 358 Hence, X2 could be identified as having no requirement of
consumer payment at all. If this referent was chosen, instead of
causing infringement, credit card services might be viewed as limiting
infringement; the amount of people willing to access the images for
free would certainly be greater than the amount of people willing to
pay to access the images.
Judges may also disagree as to the appropriate philosophical
approach to referent selection. One approach might be to specify the
referent to the defendant's behavior by turning to some industry
standard. Thus our definition of X2 in Visa may be the estimated
action of a typical credit-processing provider. Did Visa's actions differ
significantly from what we would expect from a standard provider of
credit card services? If not, if Visa was merely following industry
practice, then Visa's actions should not be considered causative.
But we could also choose a different referent and obtain a
different causal result. Instead of using an industry standard, the
referent could be defined as some idealized credit processor that takes
proactive steps to identify and remove potential infringers from its
customer base. In that case, X2 is the hypothetical action of an
idealized credit-processing provider. Now the crucial causative
question is much different. With respect to some idealized provider, it
is more likely that Visa's actions should be considered causative.
Thus, determination of each component cause is wholly dependent
upon the definition of its referent. Employing a conservative referent
357. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing likelihood of "other viable funding mechanisms" if credit
card payments were no longer accepted).
358. See id. at 797-98 (noting that "Google's search engine.., assists in the distribution of
infringing content to internet users" and that "a website might decide to allow users to download
some images for free and to make its profits from advertising. .... !.
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that relies on preexisting practices tends to reduce the perceived
causal effects of the component at issue. Using an aspirational
referent that compares the action at issue to the behavior of an
idealized party results in a greater perception of causal responsibility.
Given the wide range of possible referent selection described
above, one criticism of our proposed test might be that judges will
continue to be free to base liability on their own subjective
considerations. Admittedly, forcing courts to identify referents does
not prevent judicial biases or inconsistencies from appearing in the
law. 359 Judges can reasonably differ on what a referent for a proposed
causal factor should be. Referent selection inherently requires some
attention to the policy considerations that are part of the proximate
3 60
cause analysis that we urge separating from factual causation.
But the answer is not to ignore the centrality of referent
selection. Epidemiology teaches that rigorous identification of
referents is at the heart of counterfactual analysis. 361 In his Visa
dissent, Judge Kozinski astutely acknowledges the need for judges to
identify the available alternatives to the defendant's conduct that they
believe to be present in the marketplace. In this regard, he follows the
epidemiological model. He concludes that there are no realistic
alternatives to credit card processing services. 362 Whether one agrees
with Judge Kozinski's answer in this regard is not the point. The point
is that in evaluating causation, a trier of fact must always assess the
availability of realistic alternatives to the defendant's activity. An
event or action can only be considered a cause with respect to some
specified alternative. Whether an idealized or conservative choice is
made for a referent, courts should make their choices of referents
transparently. Open selection of the alternative permits other courts
to challenge the selection if they disagree. It also allows subsequent
courts to change their causal analysis if new information places the
selection of the referent into question.
In addition, there are some guideposts for referent selection
that reduce the potential for judicial discretion. For example, the Visa
majority fretted that if it defined material contribution in a way that

359. No causal investigation can be fully inoculated against bias. Even in epidemiological
research, which requires that the missing counterfactual account be based on empirical
observations, some of the most respected minds have committed errors in referent selection that
only came to light years later. See, e.g., Paul D. Stolley, When Genius Errs: R.A. Fisher and the
Lung Cancer Controversy, 133 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 416, 416 (1991) (discussing the erroneous
data selection behind Fisher's conclusions).
360. See supraPart II.C.1.
361. See supranotes 346-48 and accompanying text.
362. Visa, 494 F.3d at 814, 817.
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ensnared the credit card service provider, then utilities that provide
363
water and electricity to a direct infringer would be liable as well.
Reasonable referent selection and testing through counterfactual
analysis is the key to this dilemma. If the utility's action is removed
from the causal mechanism, there is really nothing to replace it
with-that is, no reasonable referent. We cannot replace the provision
of electricity with something else. Nor can we replace the current
regime with a new one requiring utilities to monitor their subscriber's
conduct for infringement. 364 When no reasonable referent can be found
for a proposed causal component, the component must be removed
365
from the causal mechanism.
Similarly, a defendant search engine should not escape causal
responsibility simply because another search engine will take its place
if its services are removed. Neither a court nor a scientist should use
as a referent the same action provided by a different actor. A lawyer
for Google might make the argument that if Google did not help online
consumers find infringing content, another search engine would. If the
only alternative to Google facilitating infringement is some different
type of service provider facilitating infringement, then Google's
actions cannot be described as causal. But appropriate referent
selection requires a court to posit a different action to replace the act
at issue, not just a different actor. At least for the purposes of
determining legal liability, a referent is not reasonable if it presumes
the presence of illegal activity. If Google's behavior violates the law,
then it is not reasonable to adopt a referent that assumes that
identical illegal activity will take its place.
The discussion of causality in this Part highlights three things
lacking in current contributory infringement analysis. First, the
definition we offer is phrased in a way to permit liability in the face of
overdetermination and multifactor causation. The but-for test only
finds factual causation when the counterfactual removal of the
defendant's act reveals that the infringement would not have
occurred. In contrast, our definition allows for causation when the act
is part of a set of acts sufficient to produce infringement, even if
363. Id. at 800.
364. Someday the reasonableness of this referent may change as anti-piracy recognition
technologies become more and more sophisticated. See Sonya K. Katyal, Filtering, Piracy
Surveillance and Disobedience, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 401, 405-06 (2009) (discussing
developments in anti-piracy enforcement technologies).
365. See ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 280, at 7 (discussing the necessity of specifying a
referent for every causal component). For an interesting discussion on how to find a reasonable
referent for Buffy the Vampire Slayer, see Jason Kawal, Should We Do What Buffy Would Do?,
in BUFFY THE VAMPIRE SLAYER AND PHILOSOPHY: FEAR AND TREMBLING IN SUNNYDALE 149, 153-

56 (James B. South ed., 2003).
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another set of acts could cause infringement as well. Second, the
definition invokes general, not specific causation. Instead of only
finding causation when the defendant's action can be tied to a specific
act of infringement, the definition permits causation when removal of
the defendant's action results in some decrease in overall harm to the
plaintiff. Third, the definition, by including the phrase "with respect to
some alternative," mandates that the trier of fact make explicit in her
counterfactual analysis that a reasonable referent to the defendant's
conduct has been identified. Causation is completely dependent on the
analyst's choice of referent. By forcing these choices to be explicitly
stated, the definition ensures that judicial perceptions of the
marketplace will be subjected to full scrutiny by higher courts and the
public.
CONCLUSION

Contributory infringement law stands at a crossroads. Having
decided to expand the doctrine beyond manufacturers and
distributors, courts now need to set principled limits on liability that
offer some predictive content to technologists. As it stands now,
contributory infringement law is a confusing stew of ambiguous terms
and inconsistent decisions. We suggest two reforms to get contributory
infringement law back on the right track.
First, greater attention should be paid to the rules of causation
laid out in tort law. As it stands now, to the extent contributory
infringement decisions address causation at all, they do so in a
conclusory and inconsistent manner. Both the Supreme Court and
legal scholars have suggested greater attention should be paid to tort
law when assessing the liability of indirect actors for intellectual
property infringement. But that is not nearly specific enough guidance
for courts wrestling with the material contribution requirement. The
law of aiding and abetting, the closest tort law analogue to
contributory infringement, lacks coherence and varies depending on
the underlying tort and jurisdiction. Yet the aiding and abetting cases
do take seriously the requirement that the defendant somehow cause
the underlying tortious act.
Tort law's rules of causation offer valuable guidance for courts
struggling to find a principled framework for their contributory
infringement decisions. Tort law counsels that analysis of factual
causation must be clearly delimited from proximate causation, an
analysis of the appropriate scope of liability that involves
considerations of public policy. Recent contributory infringement
decisions commit the mistake of intertwining discussions of factual
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causation with prudentialist reasoning, resulting in sweeping
precedents with a false stamp of empirical truth. By splitting factual
from proximate cause, contributory infringement courts would more
precisely identify culpable actors while allowing for more specific
exclusions on public policy grounds for valuable technological
intermediaries.
Second, the field of epidemiology offers significant advances in
causal theory that could be implemented in the contributory
infringement context. The current but-for and substantial factor
causation tests are not subtle enough to assess causation in a
complicated digital world. In a complex marketplace, there will almost
always be multiple actors and alternative actions available to
accomplish the same tasks. Thus multifactor causation and
overdetermination should be considered the rule, rather than the
exception, in cases of contributory infringement. Epidemiologists
recognize that causation relies on multiple sets of interdependent
components and have adjusted their causal models accordingly. They
also carefully distinguish between questions of general and specific
causation. The former is of more value to the utilitarian
underpinnings of intellectual property law. Epidemiology also counsels
rigorous attention to the selection of referents for any identified causal
component. A particular event can be considered a cause only with
respect to some alternative. The current contributory infringement
jurisprudence pays scant attention to this central command of
epidemiological research.
By its nature, contributory infringement will always be an
imprecise science. Half of the analysis involves an assessment of the
contributor's mental state, and it is never possible to peer into the
mind of another entity with perfect clarity.3 66 The other half of
contributory infringement doctrine, the material contribution
requirement, has its own complexities. But these complexities do not
justify a random, unstructured system for imposing barriers on
commercial intermediaries. By emphasizing and prioritizing the
causal roots of contributory liability, courts assessing contributory
infringement can place this area of the law on a more principled path
that satisfies our intuitions about legal responsibility while offering
predictive comfort to online businesses.

366. See Honor6, supra note 226 (explaining that issues of intent and foreseeability are
noncausal).

